| E-commerce platforms,utilizing big data and other information technologies,have expanded into consumer finance services,greatly unleashing consumer potential and raising resident consumption levels.Given the "cross-network externalities" of two-sided markets,there is bound to be some impact on supply-side merchants.In addition,with the prevalence of online shopping,the issue of commodity quality has received increasing attention.Based on this,this paper studies the effect of e-commerce platform consumer credit services on merchant commodity quality decisions,and discusses the role played by platform pricing modes and consumer market conditions,as well as the relationship between e-commerce platform consumer credit opening rules and market entry for merchants.We constructed a generalized Stackelberg model involving with the tripartite participation of e-commerce platforms,merchants and consumers,where consumer demand integrates the two-dimensional heterogeneity of consumers’ degree of preference for quality and their own funds,i.e.willingness to buy and ability to buy.Then we solve the model using backward induction and numerical simulation methods.The model results show that when the cost of providing consumer credit is below a certain threshold,the platform has an incentive to provide consumer finance services to consumers,and this behavior has a "positive externality" that can increase channel total profits.We also find that platforms and merchants adjust their respective strategies with changes in consumer market conditions.When consumer quality preferences are relatively scattered,the platform tends to choose the revenue-sharing fee model,while merchants provide lower-quality and lower-priced commodity and adopt a "small profit,high sales" sales strategy.The opposite is true when consumer quality preferences are more concentrated.However,at this time,the platform’s launch of consumer credit services will not affect the merchant’s optimal commodity quality decision.Furthermore,the model is extended to the case where consumers’ own funds are variable,and in this case,the platform is able to influence consumer demand through consumer credit strategies.Through comparative analysis,we find that e-commerce platforms providing consumer credit services can improve merchant commodity quality,and this effect is enhanced as interest rates decrease.Additionally,interestingly,providing consumer credit services lowers the commission rate charged by the platform to merchants.Finally,we construct an asymmetric Hotelling model to analyze the impact of specific platform consumer credit provision rules on the average commodity quality in the market.The study found that when platforms allow only incumbent merchants to open consumer credit services,this amounts to an increase in the competitive advantage of incumbents and inadvertently raises the barrier to entry for new entrants,but it also excludes the inflow of poor quality goods to some extent,and its impact on social welfare depends on the trade-off between the diversity of goods and the average quality of goods.In conclusion,the article provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance on the relationship between consumer credit services and merchant merchandise quality on ecommerce platforms,demonstrates a new mechanism for consumer financial services to the real economy under the e-commerce platform model,and also analyses the role of platform consumer credit service strategies in shaping the platform ecosystem from the perspective of supply chain operations. |
