Study On Entry Strategy Of Servicers Of B2C E-commerce Market From The Perspective Of Complementarity

With the rapid development of B2C e-commerce,enter the B2C e-commerce market or emerging business areas is going to an important means for competition,upgrading and transformation by more and more enterprises.However,e-commerce market is greatly affected by scale economies,which leads to high entry threshold and fierce competition.Due to the pressure of investment and the high technical requirements,it is more and more difficult to implement the traditional direct entry strategies,such as expanding production capacity,innovative R&D,brand promotion and customer subsidies.On the contrary,more and more entrants have adopted the indirect entry strategy.It takes the advantage of the strong network effect of e-commerce market and the multi-homing characteristics of users,through the complementary service relationship with the incumbent B2C platform,compatible cooperation and sharing user base,and ultimately achieves the goal of market entry.The market entry strategy of e-commerce based on complementarity has rapidly become a hot and important issue in the area of industry and academia.In view of this,this paper divides the entry strategy into three modes:horizontal complementary,vertical competition complementary and vertical cooperation complementary.On the basis of extensive reading,sorting out,analysis and induction of the relevant literatures in the past,the corresponding scientific problems,research hypothesis and research methods are clarified.The implementation conditions,business decision-making,profit,consumer surplus and the changes of social welfare,as well as the optimal strategy choice for entrants and incumbents are studied in depth from the theoretical level by model and analysis of game theory,under the three complementary entry strategies.The research results are verified by case study.It provides decision support and theoretical basis for relevant enterprises to formulate B2C market entry strategy or entry countermeasures,and also provides some policy reference for relevant management departments of government to effectively promote the healthy development of B2C e-commerce market.Firstly,starting with the platform envelope phenomenon,this paper models the process of two competing e-commerce platforms entering each other’s market through horizontal complementarity.Considering the factors effect of basic services,such as the retention value difference,the strength of horizontal differentiation and the strength of network,two modes of Hotelling-Bertrand are established in four processes,namely,envelope entry modes are advantage binding and disadvantage binding,and four processes are basic competition,application innovation,envelope entry and exclusive countermeasures.The results of model solving and comparative analysis show that:Envelope entry is based on complementary and compatible cooperation with innovative applications of competitive platforms.So that competitors have the opportunity to enter their own innovation market at low cost,and then occupy the basic service market.For entrants,the envelope entry based on advantage bundling is more likely to succeed with the increase of advantage.The price of entrants is lower than that of incumbents,which makes them more competitive.However,based on the envelope entry of disadvantage binding,entrants will change from accommodating entry to containment entry with the increase of disadvantage.The price of entrants is higher than that of incumbents which makes them weaker competitive.The entrants have more opportunities to implement vertical envelope and have greater risks,but there are higher requirements for the strength of enterprises.The entrants have fewer opportunities to horizontal envelope,but have smaller risks.For incumbents,exclusive strategies based on advantage bundling are not conducive to blocking entry,but can only improve profits;exclusive strategies based on disadvantage bundling are the opposite.However,no matter which envelope mode is adopted,the stronger the incumbent is.the greater the possibility of success for exclusive countermeasures.Envelope entry forces platform enterprises to innovate continuously.that is indirectly promotes the continuous improvement of consumer surplus and social welfare.Secondly,this paper condenses the case of upstream and downstream complementary partners of service supply chain from compatible cooperation to competitive entry,abstracts the problem for market competitive entry strategy of B2C e-commerce based on vertical complementarity.By introducing two factors of platform experience level and compatibility level,the paper establishes the models of Stackelberg leader game and Cournot game in the processes of complementary compatible cooperation and competitive entry for monopoly incumbent and duopoly incumbent,respectively.The optimal decision-making choice of incompatible cooperation,compatible cooperation and competitive entry stages of complementary upstream and downstream is studied,and the comparison of different entry modes is made.The results show that vertical complementary compatibility is a better strategy for enterprises outside the platform market to enter the platform market.The higher the level of experience and compatibility of the incumbent platform is,the greater the benefits of compatibility cooperation,but the greater the entry threat.In the stage of compatibility and cooperation,the incumbent platform is suitable for the implementation of price increase strategy.In the stage of competition entry,if the compleimentarity is lower,the incumbent platform should increased the price,and the entry platform should lowered one;if the complementarity is higher,the incumbent platform should lowered price,and the entry platform should increased one.For monopoly-incumbent platforms,when the level of experience is lower,it does not implement compatibility strategies.When the level of experience is higher,the upstream enterprises with higher complementarity can be selected to be compatible with each other.For oligarchy incumbent platforms,the most robust strategy is to directly choose incompatibility,the worst strategy is to adopt low compatibility level of multi-platform compatibility,and the best strategy is to adopt high compatibility level of multi-platform compatibility.Finally,there are complementary upstream and downstream partners in the service supply chain,which are composed of traditional enterprises and platform enterprises.This paper condenses the case of traditional cooperative enterprises entering into the platform cooperative enterprises through complementary compatibility,and abstracts the problem of the cooperation entry strategy of B2C e-commerce market based on vertical complementarity.The problem is divided into two types:non-spatial output competition and spatial output competition.By introducing factors such as customer satisfaction,service cost,fixed input and sales commission ratio,the models of Cournot game and Cournot-Hotelling game are established for four types of cooperative entry modes:platform provision,logistics provider provision,integrated self-operation and integrated outsourcing.The strategy choice and profit change of complementary parties are compared under different modes.The results show that,without considering the spatial competition,the platform provision mode and the integrated self-operation mode are the best optimal strategies to improve the service level of e-commerce platform,while the logistics provider provision mode and the integrated outsourcing mode are the sub-optimal strategies.Integrated self-operation mode is an advantage strategy for price competition and market share expansion of self-operated e-commerce platform,but when the service cost is high,the profitability of the platform is poor.Logistics provider provision mode is an advantage strategy for price competition and profit promotion of open e-commerce platform,but when the service cost is low,the profitability of the platform will decline.When considering the spatial competition,the integrated self-operation mode is the advantage strategy for self-operated e-commerce platform to enhance profits,but the price competition has disadvantage;the platform provision mode is the disadvantage strategy of open e-commerce platform to enhance profits,but the price competition has advantage.