Banking Executives, Credit Resources And Corporate Inefficient Investmen

In listed companies in China,the problem of inefficient investment is widespread.Low investment efficiency not only has a negative impact on the company’s own business development,but also affects the stability of the entire market.At present,China’s economy is in a period of transformation,To achieve rapid and stable economic development,the contributions bring by the enterprises is inevitable.How to reduce inefficient investments made by enterprise managers out of self-interest motivation,improve the operating conditions of enterprises to achieve long-term development,and thus help Chinese economy achieve further takeoff has become a major problem to be solved.Therefore,in order to reduce the occurrence of inefficient investments,analysing the factors which cause inefficient investment in enterprises is of great significance for achieving long-term development of enterprises at the micro level and achieving high-quality development of the real economy at the macro level.High order theory believes that the background characteristics of executives can also be an important factor to affect the business decisions of the companies.Bank background executives,who have previously worked in banks can use their bank social capital to bring more bank credit resources to the companies and influence the capital flow,in this way,bank background executives can finally affect the investment efficiency through affect the investment decisions of the companies.This paper chooses to explore the mechanism by which bank background executives influence the bank credit resources and investment efficiency of enterprises.This article takes Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2021 as research samples,and empirically tests the mediating mechanism of credit resources on bank background executives and inefficient investment of enterprises.It also examines the moderating effect of executive compensation incentives on the two of them.The research conclusions of this article indicate that:(1)Bank background executives can bring more bank credit resources to the enterprises;(2)Bank background executives increase the bank credit resources of the enterprises,however,the expansion of bank credit resources will finally impose negative influence on investment efficiency of the enterprises,bank background executives are positively correlated with enterprises’ inefficient investment and bank credit resources produce a significant mesomeric effect on the relationship between bank background executives and the enterprises’ inefficient investment;(3)The compensation incentives for executives not only fail at suppressing the positive promoting effect of bank background executives on inefficient investment in enterprises,but also enhance this promoting effect.Through exploring the impact path of bank background executives on enterprise inefficient investment and the mediating mechanism of credit resources between the two of them,this article dedicates to enriching the relevant research on the impact of bank background characteristics on enterprise investment decisions as well as providing policy recommendations for the enterprises which in trouble.This research helps to have enterprises pay more attention to the construction of the executive team’s professional background and call for rational use of relational financing for the purpose of improving investment efficiency,enhancing corporate performance,and achieving long-term development in the market,which has important practical significance.