Research On The Aggregation Of Ride-Sharing Platforms With Cooperation Strategy

Traditional ride-sharing platforms,gathering idle vehicles on the Internet,have reduced the information asymmetry between drivers and customers,which is helpful for relieving taxi difficulty as well as reducing traffic jam,and have gradually developed into the mainstream car-hailing means of consumers.Then Amap creatively constructed aggregation ride-hailing platform.On the one hand,it creates new channels for consumers’ travel choices.On the other hand,traditional ride-sharing platforms could choose to enter via paying emissions while operating their own exclusive channels,in order to obtain more market share.But in the ride-sharing field,Didi Chuxing has competed for market share fiercely with opponents through subsidies,acquisition and other methods.At present,Didi Chuxing accounts for 90%of the domestic market share,and its reputation far exceeds the Amap’s.If choose to join,Didi Chuxing not only needs to pay promotive commission,but also competes with other traditional ride-sharing platforms directly,and faces risks such as channel conflicts and customer churn etc.Consequently,according to the operation model of traditional ride-sharing platforms in management practices,this research divides traditional ride-sharing platforms into two categories,i.e.,the agent platform and the self-operated platform,and explores the advantage of choosing entry strategy when the aggregation ride-hailing platform’s reputation and competition among the two kinds of traditional ride-sharing platforms are different.Firstly,this research introduces the promotive commission rate of aggregation ride-hailing platform,which is different from the commission rate of traditional ride-sharing platform.In the second place,this research makes the aggregation ride-hailing platform’s reputation and competition between the two kinds of traditional ride-sharing platforms quantitative.Then,according to previous scholars’ excellent research results on ride-sharing platforms’ pricing,multi-channel supply chain and agency model,this research builds the price optimization model of two kinds of traditional ride-sharing platforms under different entry strategies based on cooperation.Lastly,this research analyses how the entry decisions of two kinds of platforms are influenced by the competition between the two kinds of traditional ride-sharing platforms as well as the reputation of the aggregation ride-hailing platform,and tests the aggregation ride-hailing platform can improve social welfare.It is found that whenever during the peak period or the rush hours,the self-operated platform will always choose entry strategy.Compared with the self-operated platform,the agent platform is sensible.Whenever during the peak period or the rush hours,if the competition between traditional ride-sharing platforms is fierce and the reputation of aggregation ride-hailing platform is high,the agent platform will choose entry strategy.During the rush hours,if the popularity of aggregation ride-hailing platform is high enough,the agent platform will choose entry strategy even if the competition is not fierce.When both kinds of traditional ride-sharing platforms choose the optimal pricing strategy and entry strategy,the whole consumer surplus will always increase.This research provides theoretic support for the platforms’ aggregation in ride-sharing service.