Ownership Of Common Institutions And Efficiency Of Capital Structure Decision-making

With the increasing dependence of the global high-quality development on the economic market,the domestic and foreign capital markets have transitioned to the mature innovation stage of fierce competition.In this case,the role of institutional investors has become increasingly apparent.The ranks of institutional investors in China’s capital market have been growing,and their investment scale has also become larger and larger.A diversified capital market pattern has gradually formed,which is dominated by securities investment funds,supplemented by securities companies,insurance companies,qualified foreign investors,etc.However,the factors such as incomplete information and asymmetric information caused by market segmentation are also becoming more and more serious,which leads to the increasing investment risks in the capital market.For the purpose of dispersing investment risks and obtaining excess returns,rational institutional investors often adopt reasonable investment portfolio methods,such as holding the equity of multiple listed companies in the same industry at the same time,and the ownership of common institutions arises at the historic moment.On this basis,this study attempts to verify that the ownership of common institutions is more motivated to participate in corporate governance than the general institutional investors,alleviate the corporate agency problem,and then affect the efficiency of corporate capital structure decision-making.In order to eliminate the negative impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the relevant research conclusions,this paper selects 2011-2011 as the research interval,and A-share listed companies as the research object,and empirically analyzes and studies the role and impact mechanism of joint institutional ownership on the efficiency of capital structure decision-making of individual enterprises.The study found that the synergetic governance effect and supervision and management mechanism of the ownership of common institutions can speed up the adjustment of the capital structure of enterprises and reduce the degree of capital structure deviation.Specifically,it can be divided into two aspects.When the enterprise is in debt,the capital structure of the enterprise should be appropriately adjusted upward.However,due to the pursuit of opportunistic behavior and reputation,managers tend to behave as aversion to debt,resulting in downward deviation of the capital structure.The supervision and governance effect of the ownership of common institutions can inhibit managers’ profit-seeking behavior,thus accelerating the upward adjustment of the actual capital structure and reducing the downward deviation of the capital structure.The function mechanism test confirms that the agency problem plays an intermediary role in the process of accelerating the efficiency of capital structure decision-making by the ownership of common institutions,that is,the ownership of common institutions can inhibit the self-interest behavior of management,alleviate the agency problem,and improve the efficiency of capital structure decision-making by participating in corporate governance.Further research shows that there are differences in the impact of ownership of common institutions on the efficiency of capital structure decision-making under different financing constraints,information transparency and CEO power.Compared with the low financing constraint environment,the higher the financing constraint,the more effective the joint institutional ownership can play in information transmission and collaborative governance,and the more significant the role of improving the efficiency of corporate capital structure decision-making;The lower the information transparency is,the weaker the external governance environment the enterprise is in.At this time,the more opportunities the management has for self-interest behavior.The common institutions can better play a supervisory role and improve the efficiency of capital structure decision-making;The more serious the corporate agency problem is when the CEO has more power,the more likely the managers will use their own power to "build the empire".At this time,the governance effect of the ownership of common institutions has more obvious effect on the adjustment speed and efficiency of corporate capital structure.Finally,in order to eliminate the interference of endogenous problems such as mutual causation and ensure the accuracy and scientificity of the research conclusion,this paper also conducts a robustness test.The deviation of the results caused by endogenous problems is alleviated through the use of Heckman two-stage regression,instrumental variables,difference models and other endogenous tests.The second verification of the research conclusions is carried out through the lag first-stage test,replacement variables and other robustness methods.After the relevant robustness and endogenous tests,the research conclusions of this paper are still valid,which shows that the research conclusions of this paper are reliable.Through the empirical study of this paper,it provides a new theoretical basis for the external supervision and governance mechanism of corporate governance in the capital market;At the same time,this civilization confirms the positive role of the cooperative governance and supervision of the ownership of joint institutions in the efficiency of corporate capital structure decision-making,which greatly expands the domestic research ideas on the ownership of joint institutions,and provides a new perspective for corporate governance of listed enterprises in China.