Research On The Impact Of Dual-class Share Structure Adopted By Science And Technology Enterprise

Under the new economic era,Chinese science and technology enterprises have developed rapidly and made great contributions to our economy.To develop an enterprise,it needs not only strong financial support,but also many other resources,including human resources,knowledge and technology,as well as a good management team.In the establishment and growth process of a new company,the founding team generally contributes a wealth of time,skills,management experience,human resources and other capital as leaders,thus forming a close relationship between the development of the company and the control control of the founder.The traditional single share structure can not meet the requirements of raising funds and maintaining control of the company,while the dual share structure has unique advantages compared with this way.Dual-class share structure originated from the United States and has been widely used in foreign capital markets.In the period before the dual class share structure was accepted in our country,a large number of companies that want to list in this structure have to choose overseas listing.In order to provide more financing channels for new economy enterprises and enhance the attractiveness of China’s financial market,the Shanghai Stock Exchange promulgated the Listing Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange Science and Technology Innovation Board in March 2019.The differentiated voting rights arrangement stipulated in the rules means that China has officially established a dual-share system.On this basis,this paper analyzes the case of the first Chinese Kechuang Board to use dual-class share structure to go public,and studies the system conditions required for the development of dual-class share structure for Kechuang enterprises,as well as the positive effects and potential risks reflected in the application process.This study finds that: on the one hand,scientific innovation enterprises invest a lot in R&D,but their profitability is not stable,so their financing channels are relatively limited.Compared with the traditional ownership structure,the positive impact of dual-class share structure is that it can ease the conflict between equity financing and the sideline of control rights,further ensure that the management and controlling shareholders reach a consensus,and enable the founders to focus more on long-term value creation,thus continuously improving the company’s scientific innovation ability and corporate governance efficiency.Thus,it becomes an efficient financing method for scientific and innovative enterprises.But on the other hand,dual-class share structure also has risks that cannot be ignored in the process of use,which is mainly manifested as the failure of internal and external supervision mechanism of traditional corporate governance structure,which makes the special voting shareholders have no substantive binding force.At the same time,there are also deficiencies in the information disclosure of matters related to special voting rights,which intensifies the degree of information asymmetry between special voting shareholders and general voting shareholders,and ultimately leads to the infringement of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors.In view of these problems,this paper proposes to improve the legislation on the restriction of special voting rights in dual-class share structure in our Company Law,in order to protect the interests of small and medium investors.This paper further proposes that the dual share system of our country needs to be constantly improved and improved according to the national conditions and market characteristics,so that the dual share system can serve the development of enterprises and market construction well.