Staggered Board Clause,Board Capital And Investment Efficiency

Control market is an external governance mechanism,which has an important impact on corporate governance.If enterprise managers can be restrained by the threat brought by the external control market,the control market will play a better governance role.Since the revision of the administrative measures for the acquisition of Listed Companies in 2006 and the completion of the split share structure reform,the domestic control market has become increasingly active.After the "Baowan dispute" incident,many listed enterprises have added provisions to protect the control rights of enterprise managers in their articles of association,including the staggered board of directors clause.However,some scholars point out that keeping managers in control may not be conducive to the development of enterprises.There are still many disputes about the advantages and disadvantages of setting up the staggered board of directors clause in the existing literature.Investment is an important guarantee for the promotion of enterprise value and the realization of sustainable development.However,the phenomenon of enterprise inefficient investment is widespread.The inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is harmful to the wealth of shareholders,hinders the sound development of enterprises,and even affects the growth of national economy.For China’s A-share market,the correlation between the staggered board clause and enterprise investment efficiency remains to be empirically tested.Therefore,taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to2019 as a sample,this paper empirically studies the impact of staggered board clauses on investment efficiency and the regulatory effect of board capital on the relationship between them.The results show that:(1)the setting of staggered board clauses in the articles of Association will have a negative effect on investment efficiency,It is mainly reflected in the aggravation of the problem of insufficient investment of enterprises.(2)With the improvement of the capital level of the board of directors,the negative impact of staggered board of directors on investment efficiency will be weakened.Specifically,when the educational capital level of the board of directors is high,the positive relationship between the staggered board of directors clause and the inefficient investment,especially the over investment,is weakened;When the experience capital of the board of directors is rich,the positive relationship between the staggered board of directors clause and the inefficient investment of enterprises is weakened;When the level of director relationship capital is low,the provision of staggered board of directors is more likely to lead to insufficient investment.The research conclusion of this paper provides empirical evidence for judging the advantages and disadvantages of staggered board of directors provisions,which can deeply understand the relationship between amending the articles of association and enterprise management decision-making,and provide reference and reference for enterprises to formulate targeted articles of association.