Faultline Of Board Group,Equity Balance And Investment Efficiency In Mixed Ownership Enterprises

Mixed ownership has attracted the attention of many scholars since it was put forward at the 15 th National Congress.As an important form of realizing basic economic system,it has replaced the coexistence of single ownership and multiple ownership and become the focus of enterprise reform in China.The emergence of mixed ownership gives different ownership of capital the opportunity to integrate,in this structure,each ownership of capital can give full play to its own effectiveness.The board of directors is the core of corporate governance mechanism.The efficiency of communication and information acquisition of board members in decision-making process has an important impact on enterprise investment decision-making and its investment efficiency.The theory of group fault zone reveals that the diversity of board members and the differences among members affect the communication and information acquisition efficiency of group members.Based on this,this paper studies the impact of the fault zone of the board of directors group on investment efficiency in mixed ownership enterprises.This paper studies the efficiency of corporate investment from the perspective of the break zone of the board of directors.Based on the relevant theories,the effect and influence mechanism of the fault zone of the board of directors on the efficiency of corporate investment in mixed ownership enterprises are analyzed.It is believed that the occurrence of the fault zone of physiological characteristics will make it impossible to integrate the diverse resources and information owned by the board members effectively.And it will hinder the communication among members,reduce the quality of investment decision-making of the board of directors,and have an impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises;and the generation of task-related fault zone will increase the constructive conflicts among board members and improve the accuracy of investment decision-making of enterprises.On this basis,this paper uses Richardson(2006)investment model to measure investment efficiency,non-efficiency investment(residual absolute value of the model)as explanatory variable,mixed ownership enterprise board of directors physiological fault zone and mixed ownership enterprise board of directors task-related fault zone as explanatory variable,respectively,to construct models,select China's A-share mixed ownership enterprise as research sample,and take its 2014-2017 as explanatory variable.Four-year data are used as data samples to make an empirical study on the effect of the fault zone of the board of directors in mixed ownership enterprises on the efficiency of investment and the moderating effect of equity checks and balances.Through the research,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)The physiological characteristics fault zones of the board of directors of mixed ownership enterprises have a negative impact on investment efficiency,that is,it is positively related to inefficient investment.(2)Task-related fault zones of board of directors of mixed ownership enterprises have a positive impact on investment efficiency,that is,they are negatively related to inefficiency of enterprises.(3)Equity checks and balances inhibit the relationship between the fault zone of board of directors and the investment efficiency of mixed ownership enterprises.The conclusion of this paper is helpful to enrich the related research on the fault zone of the board of directors group,to supplement the existing research results,and to provide theoretical reference for the composition of the board of directors of enterprises,and to provide policy suggestions for improving the governance mechanism of the board of directors election.