Research On Joint Decision Of Manufacturer’s Information Transmission And Channel Encroachment Under Information Asymmetry

With the fast growing of electronic commerce,the population of online shopping is expanding.In real life,many enterprises gain new profit growth points by opening up direct channels to encroach the market and expand demand.However,due to the complexity of supply chain entities and their structures,there is information asymmetry among supply chain members.To some extent,asymmetric information will affect the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy and consumers’ purchase intention.Enterprises need to take a more active way of information transmission to eliminate asymmetric information in the supply chain,information acquisition and information disclosure are two major strategies to solve information asymmetry.Because the interaction between information disclosure,information acquisition and channel encroachment is very complex under information asymmetry,so there is need to do research on this and provide decision-making suggestions for manufacturer.Therefore,this paper considers the manufacturer’s information transmission strategy and channel intrusion strategy under information asymmetry.It mainly conducts research in the following areas:(1)Research on joint decision of manufacturer’s information acquisition and channel encroachment under information asymmetry.The main research contents are as follows:This chapter considers a supply chain composed of manufacturer,retailer and consumers,in which there is only asymmetric information of consumers’ quality preference,and the asymmetric information needs to be transmitted upward,manufacturer needs to actively obtain consumer quality preference information,so manufacturer consider whether to carry out channel encroachment and information acquisition.Research shows: Information asymmetry will affect the manufacturer’s channel encroachment strategy.If the consumers are high-quality preference types and the encroachment threshold under information acquisition is greater than no acquisition,information acquisition will promote the manufacturer’s channel encroachment.If the consumers are low-quality preference types,and the encroachment threshold under information acquisition is less than that without information acquisition,manufacturers are more reluctant to encroach under information acquisition.Channel encroachment strategy will also affect the manufacturer’s information acquisition strategy.Compared with no encroachment,if there are high-quality consumers in the market,encroachment will promote the manufacturer’s information acquisition.If there are low-quality consumers in the market,manufacturers are always reluctant to obtain information,and channel encroachment has no impact on information acquisition.Considering the quality improvement,the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy and information acquisition strategy remain robust.(2)Research on joint decision of manufacturer’s information disclosure and channel encroachment under information asymmetry.The main research contents are as follows:This chapter considers a supply chain composed of manufacturer,retailer and consumers,in which there is only asymmetric product quality information,and asymmetric information needs to be transmitted downward,manufacturer needs to actively disclose product quality information,so manufacturer consider whether to carry out channel encroachment and information disclosure.Research shows: Information disclosure strategy and consumer quality preference will affect the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy.When the quality information is not disclosed,the manufacturer’s encroachment threshold is greater than that when the quality information is disclosed,so information disclosure can promote the manufacturer encroach.The manufacturer’s encroachment threshold increases with the increase of consumer quality preference.Consumer quality preference,relative cost efficiency and product quality will affect the manufacturer’s balanced information disclosure and channel encroachment strategy.Because the increase of consumer quality preference can enhance the manufacturer’s encroachment motivation and disclosure motivation,with the increase of consumer quality preference,The equilibrium strategies of information disclosure and channel encroachment that manufacturer can choose increase.Considering the quality improvement,the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy and information disclosure strategy remain robust.