| Since the establishment of the enterprise,the maximization of profit as an important goal of operation.The stronger the ability of the enterprise in cost management,the more it can occupy the competitive advantage in the fierce market.Traditional cost theory only focuses on the linear impact of business volume and production scale on cost,while existing studies show that cost presents an asymmetric phenomenon with the change of business volume,that is,the rate of change of cost is higher when business volume increases than when business volume decreases,and this phenomenon of "easy increase but hard to decrease" is cost stickiness.It is generally believed in academic circles that cost stickiness is caused by agency problems between enterprise owners and managers.The original intention of executive incentive system is to alleviate agency conflicts,so it can influence cost stickiness to a certain extent.Using the principal-agent theory,this thesis focuses on the explicit executive compensation incentive,equity incentive and implicit in-service consumption incentive in the executive incentive system,discusses the relationship between them and cost stickiness respectively,and verifies whether the executive incentive will have an impact on cost stickiness through inefficient investment.In addition,based on the special national conditions of China,this thesis discusses the difference of the impact of executive incentives on cost stickiness in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the literature review and the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry and incentive theory,this thesis analyzes the internal logic among executive incentive,inefficient investment and cost stickiness,and empirically tests the annual report data of all A-share listed enterprises except finance from 2015 to 2020.The main conclusions of this thesis include:(1)executive compensation incentive negatively affects the cost stickiness of enterprises;In non-state-owned enterprises,executive compensation incentive has a more significant negative effect on cost stickiness.(2)Executive equity incentive positively affects the cost stickiness of enterprises;In nonstate-owned enterprises,executive equity incentive has a more significant positive effect on cost stickiness.(3)Executive in-service consumption positively affects the cost stickiness of enterprises;In state-owned enterprises,executive in-service consumption has a more significant positive impact on cost stickiness.(4)Inefficient investment plays a partial mediating role in the relationship between executive incentive and cost stickiness.That is,part of the negative impact of executive compensation incentive on the cost stickiness of enterprises will negatively affect the inefficient investment of enterprises,thus affecting the cost stickiness of enterprises;while part of the positive impact of executive equity incentive and in-service consumption on the cost stickiness of enterprises will positively affect the inefficient investment of enterprises,thus affecting the cost stickiness of enterprises.Based on the empirical results,this thesis puts forward specific suggestions on the executive incentive system and cost management system of enterprises,which has certain guiding significance for enterprises to understand the generation of cost stickiness and control cost stickiness.Finally,the limitations of the study design are analyzed,and the future research is prospected. |
