Research On Cooperation Strategy Between Online Retail Platform And Social Platform Under Different Operation Modes

With the continuous rapid development of China’s online retail market for many years,the competition of online retail platforms is becoming more and more fierce,and the operation mode is becoming more and more personalized.Led by online retail giants such as Taobao,Jingdong and Pinduoduo,all major online retail platforms try to fully explore the resources and marketing advantages of social platforms through cooperation with social platforms,so as to achieve precision marketing for target users and reduce marketing and customer acquisition costs.Based on the above practical business background,this thesis explores the cooperation strategy between online retail platform and social platform.In this thesis,a stylized sequential game model is constructed to study the cooperation strategy between online retail platform and social platform under the agent mode and reselling mode.The influence of three supply chain power structures on platform cooperation is considered: the externality of revenue sharing ratio,the revenue sharing ratio determined by online retail platform and the revenue sharing ratio determined by social platform.By comparing the equilibrium profit between cooperation and non-cooperation,this thesis presents the conditions for choosing cooperation between online retail platform and social platform.The research finds that the cooperation between online retail platforms and social platforms is mainly related to marketing costs and the distribution of market shares.Only when marketing costs and market shares are in an appropriate range,that is,marketing costs are not too large and social platforms gain a certain market share,can the cooperation between online retail platforms and social platforms be encouraged.When the social platform decides the revenue sharing ratio,the value interval of parameters satisfying the cooperation conditions becomes smaller,that is,the platform cooperation motivation becomes smaller,which is caused by the firstmover advantage of the social platform at this time.The research shows that,compared with non-cooperation,the retail price of the product always increases under cooperation,while the wholesale price of the manufacturer remains the same under reselling mode.When marketing costs are low,online retail platforms have an incentive to increase their level of marketing effort to achieve higher sales,but when marketing costs are high,online retail platforms reduce their level of marketing effort.In addition,this thesis also analyzes the problems of operation mode selection faced by online retail platforms,and finds that both agent mode and reselling mode may be selected during cooperation.Finally,the extended model of observable prices is analyzed.The results are complicated by the price decision followed by the marketing effort level decision,but the main conclusion remains the same: online retail platforms and social platforms have incentives to cooperate in both agency and reselling modes.This thesis focuses on the cooperation strategies between online retail platforms and social platforms.By analyzing the cooperation strategies between platforms in different operation modes and different situations,some useful management enlightenment is obtained,which enables the managers of platform enterprises to better understand the impact of platform cooperation and provides certain references for the decision-making of online retail platforms and social platforms.