| As an independent economic supervision activity and an important part of the national governance system,auditing can maintain financial and economic discipline,improve business management,and enhance economic efficiency.State auditing refers to the supervision and inspection activities carried out by state auditing organs and auditing related personnel in accordance with law on the financial budgets,credits,financial revenues and expenditures,and final accounts of financial departments,state-owned organizations and units at all levels.Liu Jiayi(2012)pointed out that as an important component of national governance,national audit is an institutional arrangement that uses power to supervise and restrict power in accordance with China’s auditing law,and is an "immune system" with the functions of prevention,disclosure and defense.The financial revenue and expenditure audit of central enterprises implemented in state audit is a way for the state macro-control to intervene in central enterprises,which has an important guarantee and promotion function for the high-quality development of central enterprises and the healthy operation of the national economy,and the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.Studies have shown that the governance effect of state audit on central enterprises has a promoting and improving effect on the high-quality development of central enterprises(Cai Li and Mar Konona,2014;Li Jiangtao and Zeng Changli,2015),innovation input and innovation output of central enterprises,and innovation efficiency(Chu Jian and Fang Junxiong,2018).Most of these studies analyze the governance role of state audit from the perspective of corporate financial reporting,while there is little literature to analyze the governance role of state audit from the perspective of forward-looking information disclosure.As an important part of the company’s forward-looking information disclosure,the performance forecast has a significant information content(Luo Mei and Song Yunling,2012),can provide timely and useful information for external stakeholders(Huang et al.,2018),and can alleviate the information asymmetry between the market and the company(Luo Mei and Song Yunling,2012);At the same time,when the company’s future performance may change greatly,the performance forecast can effectively play a warning function and warn investors in time(Kasznik and Lev,1995;Sun Jianqiang et al.,2018).However,since the implementation of our country’s performance forecast system,due to China’s lack of strict supervision of performance forecast distortion,the regulatory risk faced by companies due to forecast distortion is also low(Song Yunling et al.,2011;Li Xiaoxi et al.,2019),therefore,the company’s performance forecast quality is low,the accuracy is low,and ambiguous disclosure are common in China.In order to eliminate the above phenomenon and improve the quality of the performance forecast of listed companies,the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange have revised the performance forecast information disclosure system many times,but as far as the current status of the performance forecast is concerned,the effect of the revision is not ideal.How to effectively supervise and standardize the performance forecast system of listed companies is still a difficult problem.So what impact will state audit,as one of the important components of state supervision,have on the performance forecast of listed companies?In order to explore the above problems,this thesis takes the announcement of the results of the audit of the financial revenue and expenditure of central enterprise groups and their holding listed companies conducted by the National Audit Office from 2010 to 2018 as a natural experiment,and takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share central enterprises and their holding listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as research samples,and analyzes the relationship between state auditing and the accuracy of performance forecasts of central enterprises by theoretical analysis and empirical testing.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between state audit and the accuracy of performance forecasting of central enterprises and their holding companies,that is,the accuracy of performance forecasting is improved after the intervention of state audit.The results of the channel analysis show that national audit can improve the accuracy of performance forecasting of central enterprises by improving the quality of internal control of central enterprises.Further analysis leads to the following conclusions.First,the governance effect of the first intervention,the second intervention and the third intervention of state audit on central enterprises and their holding listed companies is different,and its governance effect is manifested in the strongest first intervention,and the governance effect of the second intervention and the third intervention is not obvious.Second,there is a substitution relationship between external supervision of social auditing and state audit supervision.When the supervision of social audit is weak,the state audit supervision will supplement the insufficient supervision of social audit,so as to improve the accuracy of the performance forecast of the audited central enterprises.Based on the conclusions drawn from the above research,this thesis can obtain some enlightenment,the disclosure of performance forecast information is crucial for companies,regulators,markets and market participants,and the state should establish a national special audit and corresponding audit announcement system for forward-looking information disclosure such as performance forecast;National audit institutions should strengthen audit supervision and accountability,and refine the accountability of problems to personal responsibility and legal responsibility,so as to accurately solve problems;The internal control system of central enterprises should be improved and improved,and only when the root causes of the system are improved and perfected can the problem be fundamentally solved. |
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