Research On The Influence Of Equity Incentive On The Performance Of High-Tech Enterprises

The world economy,dominated by science and technology,is unstoppable.In the increasingly competitive international environment,the technology-based economy has become the core competitiveness of our country.In recent years,the state has attached great importance to the development of high-tech industries,given many policy preferences,and high-tech enterprises have developed rapidly.In joint-stock enterprises,equity incentive is a way to reward managers,attract more excellent managers,reduce the willingness of senior managers to change,and promote enterprises to improve their own performance.Because the ownership structure and property rights of our country’s enterprises are different,adopting incentives in high-tech enterprises can effectively retain the talents of high-tech enterprises and improve their business performance.Based on the empirical analysis,this thesis studies the influence of equity incentive on enterprise performance,introduces executive change as intermediary variable,probes into the indirect transmission path between the two,and studies the adjustment effect of equity concentration between the three variables.Finally,considering the effect of property right,this thesis studies two kinds of different property right high-tech enterprises.According to the conclusion of the study,some suggestions are put forward to improve the performance of high-tech enterprises in China.The results show that:(1)Equity incentive is positively related to enterprise performance,the intensity of equity incentive increases,and the performance of high-tech enterprises increases significantly;(2)There is a significant negative correlation between equity incentive and executive change.(3)As an intermediary variable,executive change plays a part in the mediating role between equity incentive and enterprise performance,that is,after equity incentive has a negative disincentive to executive change,and then improves enterprise performance;(4)Equity concentration has a moderating effect between equity incentive and enterprise performance.The specific moderating effect is shown in the first half of "equity incentive-executive change-enterprise performance."(5)There are obvious differences between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in the above conclusions.The sample of non-state-owned enterprises is consistent with the overall sample.However,equity incentives in state-owned enterprises have no correlation with business performance and executive change has not acted as an intermediary.