Research On The Impact Of Institutional Investors’ Shareholding On Corporate Inefficient Investment

Capital investment is an indispensable part of enterprise business activities,and its efficiency is closely related to the interests of shareholders and directly determines the enhancement of enterprise value,so the improvement of enterprise investment efficiency has been a hot topic of concern in academic and practical circles.However,the existence of various frictions in the real world and the difficulties of financing and expensive financing make the phenomenon of inefficient investment common in enterprises.In addition,scholars have found that the phenomenon of underinvestment is particularly serious among the inefficient investment behaviors of enterprises,which seriously affects the long-term development and value enhancement of enterprises,and also disrupts the normal operation of the securities market to a certain extent.With the continuous improvement of China’s capital market and the support of relevant policies for institutional investors in recent years,China’s institutional investor group has been further expanded and has become an important player in the capital market.As external shareholders of enterprises,institutional investors have advantages in terms of capital,information and expertise,and they have the ability and motivation to monitor enterprises and play their external governance utility.Therefore,it is of profound significance to study the impact of institutional shareholding on corporate inefficient investment,not only to explore ways to reduce the degree of corporate inefficient investment,but also to improve the research on the governance role of institutional shareholding.Based on this,this thesis examines the effects of institutional shareholding size and shareholding independence on overinvestment and underinvestment using a fixed utility model,and controls for the possible endogeneity between stress-resistant institutional shareholding and underinvestment,and further explores the internal mechanism of pressure-resistant institutional investors to alleviate underinvestment,and finally concludes the following: overall institutional shareholding,stress-resistant institutional shareholding This thesis aims to provide theoretical references and policy recommendations for reducing the degree of inefficient investment.