Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Multiple Subjects In Smart Community Elderly Car

In recent years,with the aging of the social population in China,various pension policies and smart pension service technologies have been gradually introduced,aiming at solving the contradiction between supply and demand of China’s pension service development.Under the background of "smart pension",the smart community pension service model is in its early stage of development.However,there is still an asymmetry between the supply and demand of the elderly in this model.Due to the low popularity of socialized services for the aged in smart communities,the lack of diversification of enterprise services,and the urgent need to improve government supervision and management,the continuous participation of the elderly in the aged care in smart communities needs to be further improved.In this paper,based on several related concepts such as welfare pluralism theory,principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory,we analyze the subject behavior of the elderly,enterprises,government and public welfare organizations,and construct a three-party evolutionary game model among the elderly,enterprises and government as well as the wisdom of enterprises and public welfare organizations as the main body with the goal of improving the quality of wisdom community senior care services and the internal improvement of wisdom community senior care operation.In order to fully verify the authenticity and accuracy of the influence of the change of the influencing factors on the subject behavior law,finally,the game model was simulated and optimized by Matlab2016 b,and the analysis results were used to propose related countermeasure suggestions.The research shows that in the three-way evolutionary game system,the best evolutionary stability strategy is(participation,high-quality service and strict supervision).With the increase of government subsidies and service income or the decrease of service cost,the probability of elderly people participating in services increases;If the income of high-quality service increases or the income of low-quality service decreases,the probability of high-quality service increases;If the sum of the reputation gains from strict supervision by the government and the subsidies from the higher authorities can offset the supervision expenditure,the government will tend to adopt a strict supervision strategy.In the game system of improving the internal service of the smart community pension operation,the best evolutionary stability strategy of both parties is(positive improvement,assistance).When the non-profit organization assists the operation,with the increase of the income from the positive improvement of the enterprise,the decrease of the income from the negative improvement and the expansion of the reputation income of the non-profit organization,the two parties will reach the best evolutionary stability strategy.