Research On The Impact Of Competition Policy On Tax Avoidance By Enterprises

Taxation is the main source of national revenue and has a decisive impact on fiscal revenue.At the same time,taxation has played an important role in optimizing resource allocation and regulating macroeconomic operation.However,because it is a compulsory collection method of enterprise profits by the state,it will directly affect the net operating income of enterprises,reduce the cash holdings of enterprises,coupled with China’s existing tax law collection system is not perfect,there is a huge space for tax collection and management,which means that tax law enforcement has a certain degree of flexibility,and the phenomenon of aggressive tax avoidance of enterprises is common.How to reduce corporate tax avoidance and ensure the effective operation of the tax mechanism is a key topic of concern in theoretical and practical circles.Anti-monopoly is an important way to further improve the socialist market economic system and realize the market-oriented allocation of factors.The process of reforming China’s economic system is a process of gradually introducing market competition and a process of gradually forming competition policy.From 1978 to 2008,the seeds of competition policy appeared in various reform fields along with reform policies or reform measures,and the rapid economic development trend from the GDP growth of 367 billion yuan to 31924 billion yuan can be seen that the improvement of the competitive environment has an important impact on China’s economy and society.The intensification of market competition will inevitably have an impact on business decisions,and this view has been widely recognized by the academic community,so will the important external environment change of market competition affect the tax avoidance decision of enterprises? At the same time,existing studies have shown that enterprises’ tax avoidance decisions are often accompanied by imperfect internal supervision mechanisms and opportunistic behavior of management brought about by agency problems,so will the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law affect the relationship between them and corporate tax avoidance decisions?In this context,this paper selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2013 as research samples,and uses the double difference method to study the impact of the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law on corporate tax avoidance decision-making based on the Anti-Monopoly Law officially implemented in 2008 as a policy impact.The results show that compared with enterprises with a low degree of monopoly,the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises with a high degree of monopoly has decreased significantly after the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law.The heterogeneity test shows that the inhibitory effect of the Anti-Monopoly Law on enterprise tax avoidance is more significant in regions with low marketization and rule of law.In order to ensure the robustness of the results,this paper performs regression tests by changing the sample period,substituting variable measurement,and propensity score matching,and the results remain unchanged.Further research finds that the Anti-Monopoly Law inhibits the surplus management and inefficient investment behavior brought about by tax avoidance of monopoly enterprises,and improves corporate governance.This paper shows that market competition can be used as an external governance mechanism to influence corporate behavior,provides empirical evidence on the microeconomic consequences of corporate tax avoidance for anti-monopoly,enriches the research results of the Chinese situation of "law and finance" and the literature research on the coordinated development of fiscal and taxation rule of law and competition rule of law in China,and provides a certain theoretical basis and policy reference for the combination of "promising government" and "effective market" and the construction of a "market-oriented and rule-of-law" business environment proposed by the 20 th National Congress.