Research On Pricing And Service Strategy Of Capacity Sharing Platform

The Industrial Internet and the sharing economy are changing the way companies allocate resources and capacity planning,and the mode of sharing spare capacity among manufacturing companies has gradually shown broad development space and economic benefits.This article focuses on the capacity sharing situation of the platform,using game theory,numerical analysis,comparative analysis and other methods to study the pricing and service strategies adopted by the capacity sharing platform in different market environments,and provide suggestions and theoretical guidance for platform operations.First,this thesis considers the impact of service levels,cross-network externalities,service sensitivity coefficients and other parameters,and discusses the pricing strategy when the platform adopts the registration fee pricing model and the commission pricing model under the two goals of maximizing its own profits and maximizing social welfare.Research shows that the equilibrium profit of the platform under the registration fee model is greater than the equilibrium profit under the fixed transaction fee model.The platform profits of the two pricing models are positively correlated with the network externalities and service sensitivity coefficients of the supply and demand sides,and are related to the supply side’s Capacity pricing has a negative correlation and is a concave function of the platform’s service level;the pros and cons of the two pricing models’ social welfare and the platform’s subsidy strategy for bilateral users are all related to the manufacturing cost offset by the supplier’s network externalities.In addition,there is a situation where social welfare and platform profits are both better,which is also the direction for the healthy development of capacity sharing platforms.Secondly,this thesis considers the difference in service levels between the two capacity sharing platforms,analyzes the pricing decisions of the capacity sharing platforms in the competitive market based on the Hotelling model,and compares the two platforms both adopting the registration fee pricing model,both adopting the commission pricing model,and adopting the two models respectively.The profit difference in a pricing model.The study found that: competitive platforms that adopt the same pricing model,under the influence of different service levels,the impact of user service sensitivity on platform profits is different.In addition,when the service cost is small,the profit advantage can be obtained by improving the service level.Finally,this thesis considers the user attribution to analyze the pricing and service strategy of the capacity sharing platform under the registration fee model,and discusses the two cases of bilateral user single attribution and capacity demander partial multiple attribution.Research shows that when a bilateral user is single-homed,the platform profit has a negative correlation with the service sensitivity coefficient of the bilateral user and the cross-network externality.When the demand side is partially multi-homed,there is a negative correlation between the platform profit and the supplier’s service sensitivity coefficient;however,the influence of the demand side’s service sensitivity coefficient on the platform profit is related to its value.In addition,when the manufacturing cost of the supply-side network externality offset is small or large,the profit obtained by the platform in the case of partial multi-homing on the demand side is larger.