Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation Incentives On Attachment Innovation Performance Based On The Degree Of Managerial

China is in the period of building a strong socialist modernization country.Achieving a high level of scientific and technological self-sufficiency and entering the forefront of innovative countries is the overall goal of China’s development.As the economic environment begins to recover gradually after the epidemic,China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Finance have issued a program to promote enterprise technology innovation with the aim of promoting the solid implementation of innovation policies for enterprises,establishing a mechanism for enterprises to participate in national science and technology innovation decision-making regularly,and improving the internationalization of enterprise innovation.The main position of enterprise innovation is increasingly important in the modernized economic system,and enterprises must innovate their development model,innovative economic structure and innovation-driven strategy.The development of enterprise innovation activities requires the participation of executives and the investment of enterprise funds,and requires executives to effectively use these innovation funds to create value for the enterprise.Appropriate executive compensation incentives can allow executives to make operational decisions that are more conducive to innovation development when the level of corporate risk-taking is high.There is a relationship between innovation development and executive compensation incentive mechanism.A reasonable executive compensation incentive mechanism will allow executives to make reasonable decisions in the process of corporate innovation activities,thus reducing the principal-agent problem and reducing the input cost of the company in innovation activities.This thesis takes the panel data of A-share listed enterprises from 2007-2021 as the research sample.Firstly,regression analysis is conducted to examine whether there is a significant linear relationship between executive monetary compensation incentives and corporate innovation performance.Secondly,it investigates whether risk-taking has a significant moderating effect between compensation incentives and innovation performance.In addition,this thesis confirms the reliability of the regression results by adding control variables as well as the explanatory variable innovation performance antecedent period.The empirical analysis of the data leads to the following six findings: first,among listed companies,as monetary compensation increases,executives will be more inclined to make decisions favorable to corporate innovation inputs and outputs and improve corporate innovation performance.Second,relative to non-independent executives,compensation incentives for independent executives are conducive to R&D inputs and patent outputs of corporate innovation activities.Third,the positive effect of compensation incentives on R&D inputs is more significant in state-owned enterprises relative to non-state-owned enterprises,and the positive effect of executive compensation incentives on firm innovation output is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises relative to state-owned enterprises.Fourth,corporate risk-taking plays a facilitating role in the relationship between executive compensation and corporate innovation input;the level of risk-taking plays an inhibiting role in the relationship between compensation incentives and innovation output.Fifth,relative to independent executives,the level of corporate risk-taking plays a more significant role in promoting the relationship between compensation incentives and corporate innovation inputs for non-independent executives;relative to non-independent executives,the level of corporate risk-taking plays a more significant role in inhibiting the relationship between compensation incentives and innovation outputs for independent executives.Sixth,compared with state-owned enterprises,the level of risk-taking has a more significant role in promoting executive compensation incentives and innovation inputs in non-state-owned enterprises,and a more significant role in inhibiting executive compensation incentives and innovation outputs in non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the obtained findings,practical suggestions are made for listed enterprises.Finally,the shortcomings of this thesis are reflected,and the future directions of related topics are explored.