Research On Incentive And Restraint Mechanism Of State-owned Hospitals

The ultimate destination of economic and social development is for human beings'health and happiness. Social progress and civilized advancement make people pay more attention to health. As the principal part within medical institution, state-owned hospitals play a key role in ensuing people's health care. With the perfection of socialism marketing economic mechanism, market becomes more important in adjusting resource regulating. On one hand, external environment of state-owned hospitals is changing at an unprecedented speed, on the other hand, the regulating and operating mechanisms of state-owned hospitals are still remaining characteristics of planning economy. As a result, some contradictions are becoming obvious which may hinder the development of state-owned hospitals. How to improve the management mechanism and carry out effect incentive to doctors as well as managers has become the social focus.Under these circumstances, this dissertation studies the principle and method of managing mechanism design, relate realization theory and principal-agent theory, and explain practice making use of those theories. Using research fruits from home and abroad for reference, this dissertation carries out some initial tasks with principal-agent theory, incentive-restraint mechanism and information-displaying mechanism.The most significant results and innovations are as follows:Firstly, making use of principal-agent theory, this dissertation analyzes principal-agent relation in state-owned hospitals, discusses how to convert administration- domination into market-leading.Secondly, this dissertation finds out the conjunction point of realization theory and principal-agent theory which is incentive and restraint mechanism. At the same time, a new incentive and restraint mechanism in state-owned hospitals is designed relating theories with practice.Thirdly, using model from Holmstorm and Milgrom for reference, this dissertation introduces some new variables into those models. At the same time, making use of game theory with incomplete information, this dissertation carries out model innovation and builds up the incentive-restraint mechanism for managers in state-owned hospitals. Based on that, related factors and their interaction in the mechanism are analyzed.Fourthly, taking individual cost of information obtaining into consideration, thisdissertation discusses information incentive and restriction mechanism from the point of information resource. In order to inspirit private information owner to supply real information, Holmstorm and Milgrom's mechanism is improved to make it more feasible for state-owned hospital.Finally, owing to such characteristics as government malfunction as well as market malfunction, too long principal-agent chain, descent of property right incentive and large space of efficiency and benefit, this dissertation, aiming to maximize social welfare, taking benefit of suppliers as well as demander into consideration, puts forward a systematic mechanism to enhance the efficiency of state-owned hospitals.