Air Pollution Jointly Prevention And Control Of Inter-provincial Mechanism In China

With the rapid development of China’s economy and society, air pollutionsituation is extremely severe, and air pollution has become a realistic problem tobe solved in China. This dissertation studies air pollution jointly prevention andcontrol of inter-provincial mechanism with Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as theconcrete research object, explores the management mechanism of interest’sconflicts in the provinces by means of administrative regulation, tax or emissionrights futures.The innovative achievements are as follows.1. Air pollution provincial territorial management model is builtconstruction and atmospheric pollutants reduction cost function is constructed.Through the analysis of the existing air pollution control management system ofChina, the air pollution control provincial territorial management model withprovincial governance units is built. The existing pollutant reduction cost function isreformed by using econometric methods, and China’s provinces level of atmosphericpollutant reduction cost function is also built. Through the analysis of theenvironmental statistics data for Beijing-Tianjin-and-Hebei region, the SO2reductioncost functions for Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are obtained, and further the SO2reduction costs for each province in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region are calculated underprovincial territorial management model.2. Based on establishment of air pollution jointly prevention and control ofinter-provincial cooperative game model, the optimal pollutant reduction quotasand pollutant reduction costs for each province are calculated.Air pollution jointly prevention and control of inter-provincial cooperative gamemodel consists of the regional pollutant reduction cost minimization model andpollutant reduction cost allocation model. The regional pollutant reduction costminimization model is a nonlinear programming problem with the pollutant removalP as variable. The Shapley value distribution plan is the most effective in motivatingcooperative pollution reduction among provinces by comparison with other threepollutant reduction cost allocation plans. The optimal removal of quotas， environmental compensation cost and pollutant reduction cost for each province andthe region are calculated by means of cooperative game model. The results show thatSO2reduction costs under jointly prevention and control of inter-provincialcooperative game model can be saved4.86%comparison with the current provincialterritorial management model for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in2009, and SO2reduction costs for each province of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are reducedsimultaneously.3. Air pollution jointly prevention and control of inter-provincial taxregulation model is developed, and the optimal regional tax rate is solved bymeans of KKT method.By the dynamic Stackelberg game analysis between China’s Department ofEnvironmental Protection and the provincial governments, the air pollution jointlyprevention and control inter-provincial tax regulation model is established byinducting removal P and transfer tax t variables. This model is also a bileveloptimization problem with equilibrium in the lower level. The optimal tax andpollutant optimal reduction are obtained by using KKT method. The results show thatthe optimal tax of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region should be2040.9yuan/ton under thejointly prevention and control inter-provincial tax regulation model in2009.4. Air pollution jointly prevention and control of inter-provincial emissionrights futures regulation model is established by inducting the financial futuresmethod.Air pollution jointly prevention and control of inter-provincial emission rightsfutures regulation model is established by inducting the emission rights futures priceF as a variable to solve the inter-provincial air pollution problems.The proposedmodel consists of three parts: the spot price calculation model, the trading marketstructure partition model to determine emission rights buyers or sellers, and thepollutant optimal reduction model. The empirical analysis is carried out by using theSO2reduction of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in2009as an example. The sensitivityanalysis shows that emission rights futures prices can affect directly the cooperativedepth among the provinces of Beijing Tianjin and Hebei. Cooperation among the provinces is not atffected within a reasonable range of the futures price (within the20%range fluctuations in2576.14yuan/ton), and the regional pollutant reduction costdoesn’t have distinct change.Each province prefers to control the air pollution alone inthe case of lower futures prices.Three provinces will still cooperate in the case ofhigher futures prices, but the regional pollutant reduction costs will increase.Through the comparison analysis of above models, the air pollution jointlyprevention and control of inter-provincial tax regulation model is considered asmore suitable model for promoting inter-provincial jointly prevention andcontrol mechanism in China.