Game Analysis Of Government And Enterprises In Pollution Control Under Oligopoly Market

With the rapid development of China's economic construction and industry,the environmental problems that followed have become more and more serious.Because the environmental protection involves many aspects of interests,there are complex relations,resulting in serious environmental pollution incidents occur frequently,many local environmental pollution in the governance and soon after the rebound,environmental protection into the dilemma.The formulation of the policy of environmental governance and the decision-making of enterprises under the policy of pollution control are directly related to the sustainable development of China's economy.As the policymakers and promoters of the policy,the enterprise as the implementer of the policy,the game behavior of the two jointly determines the effect of the implementation of pollution control.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the game of government and enterprises in pollution control.This article embarks from our country actual situation,based on the theory of environmental economics,using the game theory research methods,in order to achieve economic benefits,environmental benefits and social benefits and win-win as the goal,considering the government's tax rate,reduction rate and enterprise consumer preference factors such as green under symmetric information,the three stage dynamic game model between the sewage charges and emissions trading under the government regulation and the two oligopoly producers were established;under asymmetric information to consider the enterprise pollution reduction effort level,environmental quality standards,government incentives,government supervision and other factors,the sewage charges and emissions trading under the government and the two oligopoly task principal-agent model respectively.The establishment of.On this basis,on the model analysis,the optimal tax rate by the government and enterprises emission reduction rate,the strength of the government and enterprise incentive effort level,further shows the behavior of government supervision of sewage enterprises can effectively improve the effort level,higher satisfaction of consumers' green enterprise's level of effort is greater.Under the optimal decision of actors under different models,a numerical example is used for sensitivity analysis to further explore the influence of external parameters on the optimal decision-making of government and enterprises,and put forward rationalization proposals for government policy making and enterprise production decisions.