Research On Optimization Of Government Safety Production Regulation Mechanism Based On Game Theory

In China,governmental production safety regulation has been regarded as an important part of accident prevention.However,both in practice and academia,research has found that the current compliance-based regulation mechanism is an important contributoer to inhibiting effect of safety regulation.In contrast,many developed countries in the West have established a self-regulatory mechanism based on framework law and employee participation due to the impact of the Robens Report.There are also some dilemma for the complete self-regulatory mechanism,which cannot be fully implemented in China.Therefore,exploring the balance between the two types of regulatory mechanisms is of great significance in optimizing the current governmental regulatory mechanism for production safety,preventing major accidents,and improving the industrial efficiency.Based on this research background,this paer is guided by government regulation theory,social cost-benefit analysis theory,risk management theory,and information asymmetry theory,and proposes a game analysis method for government regulatory departments and enterprises under two types of regulatory mechanisms.Research on strategic choices and revenue relationships.The main results of the research include:(1)To establish the signalling game model of the compliance-based regulatory mechanism and the evolutionary game model of the two regulatory mechanisms respectively.It was found that due to the widespread lack of information in the process of promulgating laws and regulations,which reduce the inherent effectiveness of laws and regulations,thereby the regulatory mechanism was inhibited from working.The semi-quantitative results showed that under China's national conditions,the benefits of self-regulatory regulation are less than the compliance-based regulatory mechanism.However,under pure policy,the equilibrium choice between the compliance-based regulatory mechanism with local stability and the corresponding strategic choices of the two game players is uncertain,indicating that there is still much room for improvement in compliance-based regulation.(2)Based on the theory of social cost-benefit analysis,the parameters in the game regulatory model were quantitatively designed and estimated.The results showed that the equilibrium point benefits of pure policy compliance-based regulatory mechanisms are a-31746.67 and a-11389.16,which are both greater than the benefits of full selfregulatory regulatory mechanism a-35248.07.The effective combination of the two models under the mixed strategy showed that the total revenue of the safety regulatory system is increasing when the two types of regulatory mechanisms can be used in combination and the proportion of compliance-based regulation is placed in the range [0.3796,0.5].(3)The four main control strategies under the self-regulatory mechanism are added to the game process of the original compliance-based regulatory mechanism.The equilibrium change of the system's returns is analyzed,and MATLAB software is used for simulation research.It was found that the implementation of three control strategies can make the system more efficient.(4)Based on the SCORE project,this article designs and implements an optimization scheme for the safety production supervision mechanism from the government and enterprise levels.The phased implementation results show that combining some operational methods of self-regulation with the current safety production regulatory mechanism will help improve regulation efficiency and enterprise safety management level.