Collaborative Emission Mitigation And Regulatory Strategies Of Port And Shipping System Based On Multi-Player Game

The port and shipping industry is considered one of the greenest and most economical modes of transportation globally and an essential link in promoting global economic and trade development.But the environmental pollution brought about by the thriving port and shipping industry is gradually attracting attention.In recent years,China’s government has taken emission control,emission reduction subsidies,and other control measures to promote energy conservation and emission reduction in the port and shipping system(PSS),but with little success.The problem of emission reduction in the PSS involves conflicting goals from multiple perspectives.On the other hand,the issue of emission reduction in the PSS is a systemic project that evolves over a long period with multiple players playing against each other.Therefore,developing a collaborative emission reduction and control strategy for the PSS under the conditions of multiple games has become a critical issue that needs to be solved.To enhance the effects of energy conservation and emission reduction in the PSS,we proposed an analytical method for collaborative emission reduction in the PSS under emission control to reveal the superiority of cooperative emission reduction;considering government green demand subsidies,we proposed a simulation method integrating game theory and system dynamics to provide a theoretical basis for analyzing the long-term applicability of government subsidies;considering the regulatory mechanism under the government’s technology subsidy and emission tax policies,we examined the evolutionary stability of the multi-entity emission reduction strategy of the PSS to provide a reference for the government’s long-term emission reduction control measures for decision-making.The specific research findings are as follows:(1)We analyzed the connotation of PSS,analyzed the main components,multi-subject sources and measurement methods of PSS emissions,summarized the current emission control areas,technical abatement measures and market abatement methods in combination with the characteristics of the research problem,clarified the interests of multiple game subjects in PSS from the perspective of qualitative analysis,and further explored that the abatement strategy of port and maritime system contains three key issues of synergy,incentive and regulation,which laid the theoretical foundation for further research on synergistic abatement strategies and government regulation measures in PSS.(2)Considering the coordinated emission reduction behavior of PSS under government emission control,we constructed a port-led Stackelberg game model for emission reduction in the two stage shipping supply chain under the green preference of shippers and obtain centralized decision-making,Nash bargaining,and emission reduction cooperation respectively.The optimal equilibrium solution under different decision-making structures includes costsharing and benefit-sharing.A comparative analysis was carried out on port price,freight volume,emission reduction,and PSS profit.Finally,taking the actual case as an example,the numerical analysis is carried out on the optimal results of different decision-making structures,the validity and rationality of the model results are verified,and policy suggestions for promoting the coordinated emission reduction of the PSS are put forward.(3)To evaluate the effect of government green subsidy,we constructed a game model of emission reduction in PSS under green subsidy.We derive the rate change of shipping companies,the actual subsidy amount of shippers,and the optimal subsidy intensity of the government before and after the subsidy based on the equilibrium solution of the game decision.And the analytical solution of the critical subsidy point is derived.Further,the reaction function of the game model is combined with the system dynamics method,and its complex nonlinear feedback is used to conduct sensitivity analysis on parameters such as changes in shippers’ preferences,advances in emission reduction technology,and differences in decision cycles and heterogeneity of market demand.Finally,different parameter combination schemes are designed to analyze the dynamic changes in the abatement strategy of the PSS under the influence of compound factors.(4)Based on government technology subsidies and emission tax incentives and punishments,as well as considering government regulatory behavior as a critical factor affecting the emission reduction strategies of ports and shipping companies,we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model including local governments,ports,and shipping companies,using the Lyapunov indirect method from nonlinear control to analyze the dynamic evolution path and influencing factors of each participant in the emission reduction of the PSS.We discussed the tripartite system’s overall evolution and stability strategy through the Jacobian matrix.Further,real numerical examples are used to analyze the mutual influence of the initial strategy of the three parties,as well as the impact of government subsidy intensity and emission tax intensity on the evolution strategies of ports and shipping companies,to provide theoretical reference for local governments to formulate appropriate and effective emission reduction management and control measures for the port and shipping system.