Research On The Impact Of Carbon Emission Policies On Oligopoly Manufacturers' Game In The Vehicle Market

In response to the environmental protection policy issued by the United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP)and in order to accelerate the pace of industrial upgrading in China,the transformation and upgrading from traditional fuel vehicles to new energy vehicles(battery electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles)appeared in the vehicle market.The rapidly research and development(R&D)of new energy vehicles is considered to be important measure to promote the coordinated development of the industry and the environment and to promote the sustainable development of the industry.On basis of the game analysis of duopoly fuel vehicle manufacturers,this dissertation explores the game behaviors of oligopoly manufacturers based on the impact of carbon emission policies,by using game theory and complex system theory in the vehicle market.This dissertation evaluates vehicles' prices,and carbon emission reduction of the vehicle market from the perspective of carbon emissions policies,manufacturers' profits,and social welfare.The main research conclusions and innovations of this dissertation are as follows:1.This dissertation discusses the quantity decisions of duopoly fuel vehicle manufacturers that produce alternative products by considering the quality of domestically-owned and joint-venture fuel vehicles produced by duopoly manufacturers.In view of the various demand in the vehicle production cycle,a dynamic game model of demand is established,the complex dynamic behaviors of the vehicle market during a long-term repeated game are discussed,and the optimal profits of the duopoly fuel vehicle manufacturers are calculated.In addition,this dissertation builds a dynamic game model where manufacturers adopt demand delay decisions,And this dissertation studies the impact of demand delay parameters on the stability of the fuel vehicle market and manufacturers' profits.The optimal delay decisions of manufacturers are analyzed as well.By comparing the dynamic game model with or without delay decisions,it is found that adopting reasonable delay decision will benefit to duopoly fuel manufacturers.2.This dissertation examines the short-and long-term repeated game behaviors of duopoly manufacturers that produce battery electric vehicles and fuel vehicles.Considering consumers' low-carbon preferences and government's subsidy strategy,this dissertation analyzes the optimal decisions of duopoly manufacturers and the government under three game models: non-cooperative,cooperative and cost sharing contracts.The result shows: in terms of manufacturers,the increase in consumers' lowcarbon preference will increase in the total profits of three game models.In terms of the government,it is not that the higher the low-carbon subsidies,the better the transformation and upgrading of the vehicle market.The low-carbon subsidies should be controlled within a reasonable threshold.3.Considering of consumers' low-carbon preferences,this dissertation examines the short-and long-term repeated game behaviors of three oligopoly manufacturers producing battery electric vehicles,hybrid electric vehicles and fuel vehicles under carbon cap-and-trade policy.In the short-term game model,this dissertation studies the optimal decisions of the three oligopoly manufacturers under non-cooperative game and cooperative game,and analyzes the efficiency of the vehicle supply chain.In the long-term repeated game model,the complexity behaviors of the optimal decisions made by manufacturers with the goal of maximizing their own profits under the noncooperative game is discussed.It is found that three oligopoly manufacturers should use limited rational expectation strategy to ensure long-term stable of the vehicle market.The government needs to allocate more carbon emission caps to fuel vehicle manufacturer in order to improve the efficiency of the vehicle supply chain.4.This dissertation studies the non-cooperative game of battery electric vehicles,hybrid electric vehicles and fuel vehicles manufacturers under the government's three carbon emission policies: carbon tax,limited purchase and carbon cap-and-trade.This dissertation studies manufacturers' optimal decisions with and without adopting delay decision separately in the long-term repeated game.By comparing the optimal decisions in the above two situations,it is found that the more manufacturers adopting delay decision,the larger the stable range of the system;when the delay parameter is greater than 0.6,the delay decision will increase the stable range.The research in this dissertation expands the practical application scenario of complex systems,and the research results have good theoretical and practical application value.