Study On The Incentive Of Emission Reduction Behavior Of Different Types Of Enterprises In The Framework Of Mixed Enviornment Policy

Carbon dioxide is the most important greenhouse gas in the greenhouse effect. Emission reduction is one of the important measures to alleviate the greenhouse effect. For our country, energy-saving emission reduction is still facing the urgent task in the period of time. Enterprises as the main economic pollutants, the Government adopted a certain environmental policy to regulate it as an inevitable way to reduce emissions. Based on the current situation of China’s forthcoming unified carbon trading, this paper puts forward a mixed governance framework based on "carbon emission right trade policy, carbon tax policy and subsidy policy". Based on the theory of market failure and externalities,The enterprise type is divided into the symmetrical enterprises in the perfectly competitive market, the asymmetric enterprises which occupy the different market share in the incomplete competition market, and the technology spillover effect due to the technical innovation of the emission reduction. And to study the incentive and impact of the implementation of environmental policy on the emission reduction behavior of enterprises at different stages, and focus on the incentive effect of subsidy policy on the emission reduction of different types of enterprises under the framework of mixed policy of environmental policy.The research contents are as follows: Firstly, the four-stage dynamic game model of government-enterprise under the framework of mixed policy of environmental policy is constructed with symmetrical enterprise as the object of study. Three kinds of environmental policies are analyzed by inverse induction method and numerical simulation. The impact of government-enterprise decision-making behavior, the results show that the government should set a reasonable amount of carbon emissions,otherwise the mixed governance framework fails, and the implementation of carbon subsidies to better balance the carbon tax and carbon trading policy to the enterprise.The production of excellent production inhibition,enhance the overall economic activity;Secondly,the market power factors are introduced into the game strategy of the enterprises, andexpanded the the traditional researchwhich are only directed bysymmetrical enterprises in the perfectly competitive market. By constructing the two-stage dynamic game models under different subsidy policies, the existence of market power is analyzed. The results of the decision-making behavior of enterprisesshows that enterprises with market power have a high rate of emissions and because of market power, the tax rebate subsidy policy on small,high-cost enterprises have a higher production incentives;Thirdly,this paper takes into account the technical spillover factors caused by technological innovation, and makes up for the neglect of the technology spillover rate in the traditional research, meanwhile,constructed the government-enterprise three-stage dynamic game models in the situation of cooperation and competition between enterprises, the results show that the optimal level of emission reduction in the case of enterprise cooperation is superior to the enterprise competition situation, and the level of emission reduction in the cooperative situation is positively related to the technical spillover rate. Therefore, the government needs to adopt certain measures to encourage enterprises cooperation in order to improve the overall level of emission reduction and social welfare.