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Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Supply Chain Emission Reduction Under Environmental Tax Policy

Posted on:2022-08-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X X GuoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2491306566970779Subject:Master of Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In order to cope with the increasingly severe environmental problems,environmental protection policies have been implemented quickly in the world.Therefore,China has also taken a series of measures quickly to actively explore the tax policies suitable for China and fulfill its responsibility as a big country.At the beginning of 2018,the Environmental Protection Tax Law was formally implemented based on the principle of "whoever pollutes will pay taxes and how much they discharge".In this context,the management and operation of enterprises are facing major changes.Enterprises in the supply chain increasingly attach importance to the emission reduction link of production and manufacturing,and incorporate it into their production and operation decisions.In addition,it is also a test for supply chain enterprises to adopt what kind of supply chain coordination contract can enable them to improve efficiency,achieve supply chain coordination and achieve emission reduction targets.Therefore,it is an important issue for supply chain management to compare and analyze the decision of different contracts in the supply chain under the environmental tax policy.This paper constructs a two-level supply chain decision model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer under environmental tax policy.Based on the game model of the supply chain under different contracts,the paper studies the operation decision of the manufacturer and retailer in the supply chain and the method to coordinate the supply chain as a whole.Firstly,a centralized decision model of supply chain under environmental tax policy is constructed as a standard,and the optimal decision of supply chain and the respective profit of manufacturer and retailer are obtained by solving Stackelberg game.Secondly,a game model of wholesale price contract for supply chain emission reduction under environmental tax policy is constructed,and the influence of wholesale price contract on supply chain decision is analyzed by comparison.Again,in view of the supply chain emissions reduction decision problem,design a reasonable reduction of the supply chain under the green taxes policy of revenue sharing contract and cost sharing contract of supply chain game model,gives the optimal revenue-sharing ratio and optimal cost sharing proportion,obtaining the optimal decision of supply chain and the result of equilibrium,and compared with the wholesale price contract decision analysis of revenue sharing contract and cost sharing contract affect supply chain decisions.Finally,the supply chain of wholesale price contract,revenue sharing contract and cost sharing contract is compared and analyzed,and the difference of environmental tax on the profit,wholesale price,retail price,product output and emission reduction of enterprises in the supply chain node is verified and observed by numerical analysis respectively.The results show that :(1)No matter which game model is chosen,the equilibrium results will change with the change of environmental protection tax rate;(2)The equilibrium results under the revenue-sharing contract and cost-sharing contract are better than those under the wholesale price contract;(3)using revenue sharing contract under the decision of each enterprise in the supply chain profits than the use of cost sharing under the decision of each enterprise on the supply chain profit,but as green taxes tax rates rise(rise to green taxes tax cap),these two kinds of decision making under the manufacturers(retailers)the differences between profit increases gradually,gradually narrowing the difference of until after disappear;(4)The retail price under the decision of using a revenue-sharing contract is lower than that under the decision of using a costsharing contract.However,with the increase of the environmental protection tax rate(up to the upper limit of the environmental protection tax rate),the difference gradually increases first and then decreases until the difference disappears.(5)The product demand under the decision of using a revenue-sharing contract is greater than that under the decision of using a cost-sharing contract.However,with the increase of the environmental protection tax rate(up to the upper limit of the environmental protection tax rate),the difference gradually increases first and then decreases until the difference disappears.(6)The emission reduction degree under the decision of using a revenue-sharing contract is higher than that under the decision of using a cost-sharing contract,and with the increase of the environmental protection tax rate(up to the upper limit of the environmental protection tax rate),this difference gradually increases first,then gradually reduces and disappears.To sum up,the decision of using revenue sharing contract can cushion the impact of the existence of environmental tax and the increase of environmental tax rate on the supply chain to a greater extent.The effect of cost-sharing contract on supply chain emission reduction incentive is not as good as that of revenue sharing contract.
Keywords/Search Tags:environmental tax, incentive mechanism for emission reduction, revenue sharing, cost sharing, supply chain coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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