The Inquiry On Koyré's Scientific Revolution View

Alexander Koyré's historiography of science is based on a philosophical foundation,which takes Platonic mathematical realism as its ontology,“the unity of human thought” as its core principle,the method of conceptual analysis and the emphasis on the study of “error” as its methodologies.Koyré's research on the Scientific Revolution is fundamentally a concrete manifestation of the philosophical basis of his historiography of science.Stump believes that Koyré is an Hegelian;Agassi believes that Koyré is a Popperist,but neither of these views is tenable.The current meaning of the term “Scientific Revolution” is,in a great degree,derive from Koyré's groundbreaking research on the origin of modern science.Koyré's has various descriptions of the nature of the Scientific Revolution,including Destruction of the Cosmos and Geometrization of Space,the Mathematicalization of Nature and the Mathematicalization of Science,from the World of the “More or Less” to the Universe of Precision,from the Close world to the infinite universe.These descriptions correspon to two different levels of transformation,that is,(narrow sense)scientific revolution and intellectual revolution;this two level transformation fully embodies the core principle of “unity of thought”.Koyré use the method of conceptual analysis to refute the continuous interpretation of the relationship between modern science and medieval science by Duhem and Crombie,and thus defends the view of “Scientific Revolution”.Stump believes that Koyré made concessions to the continuous interpretation of the origins of modern science in his later years,but this view does not hold.Koyré firmly opposes the positivist(including empiricism and instrumentalism)interpretation of the Scientific Revolution,which he oppose as the triumph of experience over reason or the substitution of “how” for “why”.Based on Platonic mathematical realism and the central principle of “unity of thought”,Koyré assert that experiments play little role in the Scientific Revolution and that Newton is not an instrumentalist but a realist.Koyré also refute the sociological interpretations of the Scientific Revolution put forward by Hessen,Olschki and Zilsel.His conclusions are:(1)the practice turn is the result of the Scientific Revolution rather than the cause;(2)the Scientific Revolution has nothing to do with the rise of Capitalism;(3)social conditions are only necessary conditions but not sufficient conditions for the origin of modern science.Elkana's attempt to portray Koyré as the forerunner of the sociology of scientific knowledge does not hold.Koyré portray Galileo as a Platonist.In his view,Galileo's Platonism is embodied in three aspects :(1)the division of “two worlds”;(2)mathematical realism;(3)“doctrine of reminiscence” and “spiritual art of practice midwifery”.There are three main objections to this view:(1)Galileo is an Aristotelian;(2)Galileo is an Archimedes;(3)Denying the connection between Galileo and any philosophical label.De Caro trying to shows that,despite these objections,Koyré's core arguments about Galileo is a Platonism can still conditionally maintaine.Koyré's views on Galileo's(thought)experiments are concern with the metaphysical level(“ought” level)and historical factual level(“actual” level);the metaphysical level of interpretation dominates the historical factual level of interpretation.Settle and Drake argue that Koyré's assertion that Galileo failed to produce the results of the experiments he described is false and inconsistent with historical fact;Naylor and Jorland trying to defend Koyré's view of Galileo's experiments.However,the debate between them only involves the historical fact(the “actual” level)and does not involve the metaphysical level(the “ought” level).Koyré's historiography of science and his research on the Scientific Revolution are still very enlightening and fruitful today.