Research On The Trans-boundary Water Pollution Compensation Standards From The Perspective Of Game Theory

The problem of cross-border water pollution has become the focus of the competitive contradiction among river basins.To solve this problem,the compensation mechanism for cross-border water pollution has attracted much attention.The key to establish an effective ecological compensation mechanism lies in the determination of compensation standards.Whether the compensation standard is scientific and reasonable determines whether the basin ecological compensation can be implemented smoothly and achieve the compensation effect.At present,there are many different calculation methods of compensation standard at home and abroad,scholars have not formed a consensus.The existing studies often calculate the compensation standard from the perspective of a certain interest subject,ignoring the participation and consultation of stakeholders.In order to give consideration to the interests of the compensation subject and object,this paper designs the compensation interval based on the income and loss of the compensation subject and object,and uses the bargaining game model to narrow the interval,and determines the specific compensation standard through the game negotiation.In this paper,the gray prediction model is used to fit the relationship between water quality and emission of cross-border monitoring section,so as to determine the theoretical emission;according to the difference between the actual emission and the theoretical emission,excess emission is obtained;then,based on the cost of sewage treatment and opportunity cost of excess emission,the compensation standard gray interval is designed.Using Rubinstein bargaining model to discuss the compensation interval,then determine the specific compensation standard,and discuss the influence of the bidding order,the length of the game period and the size of the discount factor on the game results.In this paper,cross-border water pollution compensation in Jiaozuo City of Henan Province is taken as an example to verify the feasibility of the model.Finally,according to the relevant research conclusions,this paper puts forward the relevant policy recommendations of cross-border water pollutioncompensation.The results show that in the compensation of cross-border water pollution in Jiaozuo City,the theoretical emission volume between Jiaozuo City and Xinxiang City is 40698.88 tons;assuming that the actual emission volume of Jiaozuo City is 45000 tons,the gray range of compensation standard is(981.67,16754.24)(unit: 10000 yuan);through bargaining game,the final compensation standard can be determined in the range of 2401.20~15334.71 ten thousand yuan.The influence factor analysis shows that in the finite bargaining game,the compensation standard of cross-border water pollution is related to the size of the discount factor,the length of the game period and who makes the final bid;in the infinite bargaining game,the compensation standard of cross-border water pollution is related to the size of the discount factor and who makes the first bid.According to the above analysis results,considering the influence of discount factor,game period and bidding order,the final compensation standard for cross-border water pollution in Jiaozuo City is 15176.98 ten thousand yuan.According to the relevant research conclusions,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions,such as clarifying the subject and object of cross-border water pollution compensation and their respective interest needs;promoting the construction of consultation and negotiation mechanism;improving relevant laws and regulations;doing a good job in supervision;giving full play to the role of River director system;promoting publicity and improving public participation.