The Dilemma And Transformation Exploration Of America’s Extended Deterrence In 1960s And 1970s

This paper discusses the core dilemma faced by the United States in extended deterrence strategy and defense policy in the 1960 s and 1970 s,as well as a series of policy explorations and adjustments carried out by the United States to deal with this dilemma.The central response was to the question of how the United States could maintain the credibility of its commitment to the security of its European Allies when the Soviet union had both a significant advantage in Europe’s conventional forces and continued investment in strategic power building,which posed a growing security threat to the United States itself.Firstly,this paper introduces the main connotation of deterrence theory and analyzes the different understanding of deterrence by scholars from rationalist and irrationalist viewpoints.It is believed that deterrence mainly has four value demands,namely,protecting vested interests,restraining security dilemma,appealing for stability and cost control.Then it explains the correlation between extended deterrence and basic deterrence,and holds that the two are nearly overlapped in terms of the material basis on which the deterrent disciplinary power depends,and basically consistent in terms of the credibility of deterrence.But from the dynamic perspective,the basic deterrence and extended deterrence will also face serious challenges.The extreme pursuit of extended deterrence can lead to reliance on nuclear superiority,which in turn damages the basic deterrence in terms of cost and stability over a long period of time.Based on relevant historical materials,this paper analyzes the mechanism of limited nuclear war,counterforce strike and reshaping conventional advantage.The thought of "escalation control" based on "limited nuclear war" provides a keyanalytical method and theoretical support for the construction of various deterrence policies,but there are also many deficiencies.The strong "preemptive strike" in the concept of counterforce means that it is in line with the western military strategy to take the initiative to attack,but it undermines the "strategic stability" relationship between the major powers.The remolding of conventional advantages is mainly the renewal of weapons and equipment in the name of "system reconstruction",as well as the transformation of military system and operational philosophy.Through the path of new military transformation,the United States can squeeze the geopolitical space of the Soviet union by relying on its conventional advantages.The article also analyzes the reasons for the shelving or abandonment of missile defense,deployment of tactical nuclear weapons,and priority and proliferation among Allies from the perspectives of risk,cost and other demands,as well as technical limitations and political atmosphere.To sum up,in the 1960 s,through the establishment of the principles of "city avoidance" and "selective targeting" in the use of nuclear forces,the United States tried to make the Soviet union fall into a dilemma between "submission" and "destruction" in the course of the conflict,thus giving up the challenge to the key geopolitical interests of the United States.In the 1970 s,the United States squeezed the geopolitical space of the Soviet union by restoring its conventional advantages.During the period described in this paper,the US extended deterrence strategy adjustment not only takes the core value demand into account but also relies on diversified forces,which provides support on the issue of credibility.