ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S METHOD (LANGUAGE-GAMES, GRAMMATICAL DESCRIPTION, GAME ANALOGY, PROPOSITIONS, THERAPY)

This thesis is an attempt to provide an account of Wittgenstein's philosophical method which is plausible as an interpretation of his own remarks about his method. The thesis is not a defense of Wittgenstein's method, but an exposition. The author believes that there is still no consensus as to the proper understanding of Wittgenstein's method and, without it, results in Wittgenstein scholarship are of uncertain value. The thesis does not provide a full account of the method. This first step is to explain the major concepts employed in the method, including 'grammar,' 'language-games,' 'synoptic surveyability' (Uebersichtlichkeit), and 'grammatical propositions.' The author argues that these concepts are heuristic entities, intended to help philosophers attain a perspective on language use which, according to Wittgenstein, will prove useful in the solution of philosophical problems. The explanation of how this perspective helps to solve philosophical problems is the second step in a full account of Wittgenstein's method, and is beyond the scope of the present writing.;The heuristic interpretation is shown to have various consequences for Wittgenstein scholarship. Among these are that language-games are not intended as explanatory postulates which would form the basis of a theory of language, nor are they elements into which language may be analyzed. Instead, they merely offer terms of description with which to describe language from the perspective of a synopsis of use. A further consequence of this is that the so-called game analogy is not as crucial to the success of Wittgenstein's method as sometimes supposed. The author argues that grammatical propositions, the units of grammatical description, are not philosophical theses; they do not assert claims intended as rivals to extant philosophical positions. Instead, they are mere verbalizations of rules, lacking substantive truth-value. Grammatical propositions merely exhibit the rules and procedures of language-games. It is argued on this basis that grammar is not a theory, and that Wittgenstein's later writings do not express a philosophy of language.