Research On The Collaborative Mechanism Of Work Safety Trusteeship Services In Small And Medium-sized Enterprises

In recent decades,while small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)have made significant contributions to economic development in China,their work safety issues have become increasingly prominent.The issues of work safety among SMEs have become the center of extreme attention by the government and society.Owing to the limited work safety resources of SMEs,the mechanism of work safety trusteeship and the use of professional technology of work safety service agents in solving SMEs safety issues was introduced by some regions.However,due to the professionalism of work safety services,the asymmetry of information,and the factors of the three stakeholders including local safety regulatory departments(LSRDs),safety service agencies(SSAs),and SMEs,there exists be unclear responsibilities,mutual prevarication,lack of collaboration between the three stakeholders,and “self-administration” in the process of work safety trusteeship services in SMEs.This paper aimed at understanding the collaboration between the three stakeholders,by focusing on exploring their behavioral dynamic characteristics and the quest to form a stable and collaborative relationship in the process of work safety trusteeship in SMEs.The study adopted theoretical analysis and simulation methods that combine the stakeholder theory,information asymmetry theory and evolutionary game theory to clarify the collaboration mechanism between stakeholders in the process of work safety trusteeship,and ensure the efficiency of work safety trusteeship services.First,this paper analyzed the status of work safety trusteeship services in SMEs,the behavior of three stakeholders and the interaction between stakeholders of the work safety trusteeship services in SMEs.This paper further analyzed the cause of collaboration behavior deviation of three stakeholders on the work safety trusteeship services in SMEs.To deeply examine the behavior dynamics among LSRDs,SSAs and SMEs,this paper established a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaboration of work safety trusteeship services.The dynamic simulation model of the collaboration evolution game system of the three stakeholders on work safety trusteeship services among the SMEs is as well established through the replication dynamic differential equations.Finally,based on the actual situation of T Medical City,this paper examined evolutionary stability for the strategy selections of the three stakeholders under different penalty-subsidy strategies by the Vensim PLE6.0 software.According to the simulation results,this paper put forward suggestions that can improve the efficiency of collaboration and service effects of work safety trusteeship services in SMEs.The main research conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Due to insufficient supervision,implementation of policies and insufficient support from higher-level governments,LSRDs cannot perform their duties carefully.Owing to the limited resources of work safety,weak awareness of work safety,and insufficient supervision of LSRDs,SMEs are not willing to actively collaborate with the rectification work of SSAs.Due to driven by interests of the market economy and insufficient supervision,and given the “lucky mind” of SMEs,SSAs choose not to provide work safety services carefully.There also exists information asymmetry between three stakeholders.Therefore,the collaboration behavior of three stakeholders has deviated in the process of work safety trusteeship services.(2)When the penalty-subsidy strategy is static,the pure strategy solutions of evolutionary games are not stable at the equilibrium point,that is,if the behavior of one stakeholder changes suddenly in the game,the equilibrium state of the system will be broken.In addition,the strategy selections of the stakeholders are fluctuating.(3)When the penalty-subsidy strategy is dynamic,the evolutionary game process converges to a good stable state.Further,the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the different initial values.At this time,the collaboration efficiency among three stakeholders and the effect of work safety trusteeship services are optimal.