| China has long been constrained by energy shortages and environmental pollution.Although it has improved in recent years,it still faces energy security issues and energy structure optimization while achieving the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality.China and Turkmenistan through energy cooperation to achieve the diversification of China’s oil and gas supply sources and import channels,not only can stabilize China’s oil and gas resource supply,optimize the energy structure system,alleviate urgent environmental pollution problems,but also strengthen China’s energy and related The international competitiveness of the industry promotes the international transfer of excess capacity.Therefore,studying the status quo and influencing factors of energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan has very important theoretical and practical significance for ensuring China’s energy security,accelerating the optimization of energy structure,and promoting the development of energy and related industries.Based on the foundation and development status of energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan,this paper analyzes the development potential and existing problems of energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan,and then further sorts out the factors affecting energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan,and then builds an evolutionary game model to verify that China and Turkmenistan The choice of energy cooperation strategy in Turkmenistan is affected by factors such as cooperation costs,cooperation gains,initial cooperation willingness,trade incentive policies,loss of national security benefits,and exchange rate stability.In order to explore the specific action paths of influencing factors,this article uses an evolutionary game model On the basis of,MATLAB simulation analysis is used to simulate the evolution path of the influencing factors obtained from the model.The results show that the increase in cooperation benefits is more conducive to the choice of energy cooperation strategies between the two countries than the reduction in costs.At the same time,compared with trade incentive policies,The loss of national security interests is more sensitive to the choice of energy cooperation strategies between the two countries.When the two countries’ initial willingness to cooperate is greater than or equal to 0.5,the two parties will eventually choose energy cooperation,and when the two countries’ initial willingness to cooperate is less than 0.5,both parties will choose energy cooperation.Tend to choose noncooperative strategies.Finally,based on the evolutionary game model and MATLAB simulation analysis,further targeted countermeasures and suggestions for deepening energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan are put forward. |