Research On Coordination Of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Carbon Reduction

In recent years,with the upgrading of consumer demand,the frequency of upgrading of electronic products and household appliances is accelerating,and their life cycle is getting shorter and shorter,resulting in a great deal of resource consumption and grave ecological contamination.In order to promote resource recycling,the government has actively guided enterprises to establish green supply chains through subsidies and other measures,and encouraged manufacturers to integrate recycling and remanufacturing into production.Manufacturers can not only increase resource utilization and cut manufacturing costs through recycling waste products for remanufacturing,but also diminish environmental pollution and carbon emissions.Moreover,manufacturers can choose to recycle themselves,or delegate the recycling task to retailers or third-party recyclers to augment recycling amount.Among them,retailers can reach more consumers through sales channels,so manufacturers are more inclined to choose mixed recycling with retailers.At the same time,the rapid growth of e-commerce has caused many manufacturers to become involved,connecting directly with customers through their online sales channels.Simultaneously,in order to protect their own interests,each subject will sacrifice the interests of other subjects or the overall interests of the supply chain,affecting overall performance of closed-loop supply chain(CLSC).It is clear that,to maximize the total recovery and profit of the supply chain,as well as decrease carbon emissions,it is essential to analyze the CLSC pricing and emission reduction choices can be made with "the goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality".Thus,this paper examines the mixed recycling of waste products by manufacturers and retailers,taking manufacturer-led remanufacturing CLSC as its research object.Exploring the collaboration of the remanufacturing CLSC from the two perspectives of government emission reduction subsidies and supply chain members’ fulfillment of corporate social responsibility(CSR).The main contents are as follows:First of all,this paper takes the current development status of recycling and remanufacturing as the background and the current domestic and foreign researches as the theoretical basis.By sorting out the concepts and characteristics of remanufacturing CLSC,mixed recycling mode,CSR in supply chain and game theory,a solid theoretical foundation is established in this paper for the subsequent model formation and the coordination research of CLSC remanufacturing.Secondly,the coordination of the remanufacturing CLSC is studied under the condition that the government provides manufacturers with emission reduction subsidies.Considering the realistic situation that consumers’ low carbon awareness is enhanced and the cost of carbon emission reduction(CER)is too high,consumers’ low carbon preference coefficient and government emission reduction subsidy coefficient are introduced,and the market demand is affected by both the price and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort.Based on Stackelberg game,the profit models of each party under different decision modes are constructed respectively,and the optimal pricing strategy and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort are solved.Through a comparison of the outcomes of the decision-making process emphasizes the necessity of coordinating the remanufacturing CLSC,and the mixed contract of "emission reduction cost sharing + revenue sharing" is designed to coordinate the CLSC.Finally,the effects of recycling channel competition coefficient,government emission reduction subsidy coefficient and consumers’ low carbon preference coefficient on decision-making of each main body,total profit and total recycling amount of the supply chain and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort are analyzed by examples.It is also verified that the parameters of contracts in some circumstances contribute to alleviating the competition between manufacturer and retailer cycling channels and increasing the total recycling amount under CLSC.At the same time,the profit of each main body and total profit of the supply chain and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort are improved to realize the Pareto improvement of the remanufacturing CLSC.Then,the coordination of the remanufacturing CLSC is studied under the condition that the government does not provide emission reduction subsidies and the supply chain members consciously fulfill CSR.In this paper,using Stackelberg game,three decision models are constructed: the manufacturer’s CSR performance alone,the retailer’s CSR performance independently,and the manufacturer and retailer’s CSR performance together.These models are then used to determine the most suitable pricing strategy for each main body in the supply chain and the optimal level of manufacturer’s CER effort under the circumstance that different subjects perform CSR,so as to discuss which subject in the remanufacturing CLSC undertakes CSR more conducive to the improvement of the overall performance of the CLSC,and the mixed contract of " revenue sharing + responsibility sharing" is designed to coordinate the CLSC.Finally,a numerical example is used to analyze the influence of CSR fulfillment and CSR input level on the decision-making of each subject in the remanufacturing CLSC,and the validity of the contract is verified.It is concluded that the input of CSR can improve the total recycling amount,the social welfare of each subject and the total social welfare of the CLSC system,and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort.At the same time,it is also concluded that the CSR performance of manufacturers and retailers together is better than that of a single subject,which indicates that the shared CSR responsibility of supply chain members is more conducive to the sustainable development of remanufacturing CLSC than that of a single subject.