Study On The Supply Chain Coordination With Asymmetric Cost Information And Asymmetric Capacity Information

The self-interest firm’s objective of profit maximization often creates a conflict with the entire supply chain’s objective of profit maximization. The firms with information superiority may get more revenue, so they always hide their own private information and refuse to share it with each other. In the practical production and operation, cost information is one of the primary areas where information asymmetries most likely to occur, cost information denotes an enterprise’s technical and economical index level, enterprises often regard this information as their business secret. Besides, with increased competition in manufacturing industry, manufacturing enterprises often regard capacity as one of their effective competition means, they will not reveal this information to outside easily. These two factors make cost information and capacity information asymmetry common in supply chain. This dissertation focus on designing the mechanism to reveal the private information and to decrease the information rent to improve the overall revenue of the supply chain, and to achieve supply chain coordination.This dissertation firstly studies the supply chain coordination mechanism design problem under product cost of asymmetric information in the supply chain dominated by retailers. Under product cost asymmetric information, a combined contract including revenue-sharing and surplus subsidy to reveal the truthful information has been proposed. In the contract the revenue-sharing rate and the surplus subsidy should meet both the incentive compatibility constraint and the coordination relation. It can reveals the asymmetric information and coordinates the channel at the same time.Secondly, this dissertation studies the coordination contract design problem to increase the promotion effort level and to weaken the inefficiency aroused by information rent. Under asymmetric promotion effort cost information, this dissertation proposed a combined contract including buy-back and cost sharing and transfer payment. By contrast with the traditional buy-back contract, it shows the cost sharing and the transfer payment can weaken the double effect of asymmetric information and deficiency of promotion motivation. It results in the increase of the promotion effort level. The combined contract can coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information when the promotion effort cost distribution satisfies some condition.Thirdly, this dissertation studies the coordination contract design problem under asymmetric forecast cost information. This model regards the information forecast cost as the operation cost in supply chain, and assumes the retailer is risk-averse. We found that the retailer has incentive to share the untruthful cost information for the sufficient source of goods. We proposed a combined contract including buy-back and payment. The retailer must pay for the deviation of demand information aroused by false information forecast cost. As a rational person the retailer would choose show the truthful information. At the same time, the buy-back can eliminate the effect of risk-aversion and coordination system.Finally, this dissertation studies the coordination mechanism design problem with unrevealed private information between multi-suppliers. Based on secure multiparty computation, a secure information sharing mechanism has been proposed. Under the mechanism multi-suppliers can make decision with the capacity information unrevealed, and the order quantity as same as that in the full information case. Furthermore, this dissertation proposed an information compensation mechanism based on nash-bargain model, the extra profit gained from information sharing was allocated according to the bargain power to increase the revenue of the suppliers.