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Research On The National Interests And Game With Chips In International Technological Standards Competition

Posted on:2015-10-25Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:C F XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330467464293Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As the economic globalization deepens and the information industry develops rapidly, technological advantage has gradually become the commanding height of the economic competition, and competition of technology standards is evolving into an advanced form of market competition. Businesses in all industries and sectors are attempting to make their standards the dominant standards so as to get control of the market in quest of huge commercial benefits. The ability of dominating and controlling a major industry at various times is an important measurement of a country’s competitiveness, and may even involve adjustment of a country’s industrial, economic and political structures. Developed countries that already possess absolute advantage in technology can easily become leaders in competition and make huge economic gains. At the same time, developed countries and monopoly enterprises have developed strategies of standard, and formulated a standard system to their favor by combining standards with IPR through international standardization organizations and rules. As a result, a solid technology barrier has been built, which puts developing countries in a more inferior position in the new landscape of international competition. Hidden behind the standard contentions are fights for economic leadership and protection of national strategic interests. Therefore, a more urgent issue to be addressed by developing countries is how to participate and get an upper hand in the competition of standard to maximize the national interests.Based on summary and review of the existing literature, and in response to the tendency of standard competition becoming an advanced form of market competition, this dissertation proposes a quantification function of national interests in international competition of standards, introduces the concept of chips, tries to build a multi-stage dynamic game model, and studies on the optimal approach of technology regulation and development of new technology standards by countries participating the game with unequal or equal technologic level. Specifically, innovative work has been done in the following three aspects:Firstly, this dissertation introduces a concept of maximum national interests in the international competition of standards, and proposes the quantifiable function of national interest, taking into consideration factors such as economic interests, security coefficient, and quantifiable benefit of self-developed intellectual property rights, Internet effect and consumer utility. This function is brought up from the perspective of national economic security, and elevates the level of standard competition from businesses to nations and countries.Secondly, this dissertation builds a dynamic game model of technology standard competition for situations where countries have unequal technological level, and a multi-stage dynamic game model of technology standard competition for situations where countries have equal technological level. It advises the optimal strategies of standard competition for both technology-leading countries and the technology-follow countries to maximize their national interests in the international competition of standards. Developing countries tend to be weak in technology innovations and the overall strength. They need to support and promote growth of domestic industries through right policies of industry, competition and IPR protection, and need to prevent the technology-leading countries from abusive use of their intellectual property right and standard superiority. In the case of equal technology level, this dissertation advises optimal approaches for development of new technology standard in quest of maximum national interests. Studies have shown that the result of the dynamic game model depends on benefits from IPR quantification and risks taken by two countries using different approaches and strategies.Thirdly, this dissertation defines a concept of chips in competition of technology standards, and analyzes impact of each type of chips on the game equilibrium so as to provide a theoretical foundation for the use of chips in the international competition of standards. This dissertation advises the optimal strategies and tactics in competition of technology standards to maximize national interests through a multi-stage dynamic game model with chips. Chips are introduced in circumstances of unequal technological level and are classified into safeguard chips and threatening chips. Studies are made on the technology regulation strategy of the leading countries and the new standard development strategy of the pursuer countries in three different circumstances where one country holds chips or both countries hold chips of the same kind or different kind. Studies have shown that the party with chips has advantages over the other party, and will make Nash Equilibrium change to its favor. The party with threatening chips has advantages over the party with safeguard chips. When both parties of the game hold chips, the Nash Equilibrium may eventually turn towards maximum social benefit.The last part of the dissertation analyzes competition between the TD-SCDMA telecom technology standard of China and the WCDMA standard of EU by using the multi-stage dynamic game model with chips, provides policy advices for development of4G/5G communication standards in China, and made some innovative explorations and analysis on application researches.
Keywords/Search Tags:international technical standard competition, national interests, chips, game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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