Research On The Relationship Between Control Rights Allocation And Governance Efficiency In China's Listed Companies

The control rights are the key factor of corporate governance and which guarantee the listed companies operate according to the rules. If we can dispose of the control rights efficiently, we are sure the quality of the listed companies will improve obviously, the efficiency of resources distribution will improve, too. In the long term, the companies can improve the efficiency if they make good use of control rights allocation and the control rights allocation is the inner mechanism. This paper focus on the control rights allocation, analyzing the relationship between corporate control rights allocation and governance efficiency.This paper begins with control rights theory, the separation of ownership and control rights makes control rights allocate on shareholders, boards of directors and managers. So this paper mainly researches the allocation of control right how to influence the governance efficiency. Then according to china's current situation, this paper builds control rights allocation's specific' mode of china's listed companies, which is introduced to empirical research to further explore the different modes how to influence the governance efficiency.This paper's main conclusion is that the relation between the first shareholder and governance efficiency is not in the inverted U-shape, the proportion of independent directors and board scale have shown a positive correlation with governance efficiency, the index that board of director chosen professional managers has shown a positive correlation with governance efficiency. In the analysis of control rights allocation model and governance efficiency, we can know most of allocation models distribute in "power-control" model, and the efficiency of this model is superior to other models.