Research On The Reform Of Executive Compensation System In China’s Stated-owned Listed Companies

After the world-wide financial crisis, the wealth of investors in listed companieshas shrunk greatly, while the executive compensation has become more and more,and at the same time, the managerial power of executives became uncontrolled andthe compensation system turned to be failure. The USA took the lead in the worldscope to launch a great discussion on the issue of executive compensation in listedcompanies, and started a new round of world-wide research on the reform ofexecutive compensation system.In China, because of the particularity of state-owned listed Companies, thereform of executive compensation system also requires a different approach based onthe advanced experience of developed countries for reference. With the reform of theeconomic system, the executive compensation system in China’s state-owned listedcompanies has undergone corresponding changes, objectively speaking, salaryreform in China has achieved some results in recent years, initially established thesystem framework of executive compensation management. Since the16th CPCNational Congress, China has established the management system of state-ownedassets to change the compensation of those in charge of state-owned enterprises,including the long-term uncontrolled situations of executive compensation system instate-owned listed companies in the past. In late August2014, the Political Bureau ofthe Central Committee of the CPC sit the leadership group meeting oncomprehensively deepened reform, examined and passed “Central ManagementEnterprises Officials Compensation System Reform Program” at the meeting. ThePolitical Bureau of the Central Committee has been meeting to discuss this issue, it is observed that the compensation system reform of the central enterprises officialsplays an important political role, also highlights the confidence and determination ofcentral authorities on comprehensively deepened reform. Central supervisoryenterprises, for the most part, are listed, as a result, the compensation system reformof the officials of the central enterprises and the executives of state-owned listedcompanies has been integrated, the reform of the executive compensation system instate-owned listed companies plays an important part in the reform of China’sstate-owned enterprises, which impacts on effects of state-owned enterprises reform,and relates to the success or failure of the reform of the whole social economicsystem. At present, there are problems of the executive compensation system ofChina’s state-owned listed companies in supervision and management, incentive andconstraint mechanism, main body responsibility, disclosure mechanism and so on,and the reform system of central authorities itself has a certain time lag, theimplementation situation also remains to be observed. So to speak, the reform ofexecutive compensation system in China’s state-owned listed companies at present isstill far from reaching its depth and strength.Based on China’s current economic system, reviews the changes of executivecompensation system in China’s state-owned listed companies, gives an account ofexecutive compensation system of listed companies in developed countries such asthe USA for reference, makes a comprehensive study on influential factors, theincentive and constraint mechanism, of executive compensation system in China’sstate-owned listed companies, and finally proposes the new institutionalframework and recommendations of the reform of executive compensation system inChina’s state-owned listed companies. The main contents of this thesis are asfollows:The first chapter is the introduction part. This chapter is divided into five partsto explain the frame of this thesis, including the background and significance of topics, domestic and foreign literature review of studies, the definition of relatedconcepts, research methods and structure arrangement, and also the innovation anddeficiencies. Mainly sort out and lead to the whole text, and make a definition andrepresentation of the concepts used in this paper.The second chapter refers to a review of the theory of executive compensationsystem. It mainly reviewed the allocation theory and salary theory of Marxismeconomics, the salary allocation theory and salary incentive theory of westerneconomics, and the comments on the two theories.The third chapter, analysis of institutional economics of executivecompensation in stated-owned listed companies, is divided into three sections,respectively is the theory of institutional change, institutional change of executivecompensation in stated-owned listed companies, the present situation of executivecompensation in stated-owned listed companies, the problems and causes ofexecutive compensation system in stated-owned listed companies. Mainly recalls thehistory of executive compensation system in our state-owned listed companies,theoretically analyzes the existing problems and its causes.The fourth chapter is the analysis of the factors affecting the executivecompensation system in our state-owned listed companies. This chapter is dividedinto five parts, deeply analyzes the impact of the basic factors, pay-performancefactors, governance factors and human capital factors on executive compensation instated-owned listed companies, and finally analyzed the particularity of executivecompensation in China’s monopoly state-owned listed companies.The fifth chapter is the analysis of incentive and restraint system of executivecompensation in state-owned listed companies. Firstly, this chapter analyzes thetheory of incentive mechanism of executive compensation in state-owned listedcompanies, and then analyzes the long-term incentive issues of executivecompensation system, and the application of incentive mechanism in executive compensation system of our state-owned listed companies, finally makes use of thestatistical methods to carry on the empirical research of incentive mechanism ofexecutive compensation system in China’s state-owned listed companies, whichelaborates the necessity of the constraint system in executive compensation ofstate-owned listed companies.The sixth chapter refers to the comparison and reference of executivecompensation system of listed companies in developed countries. This chapter hascarried on a brief analysis focused on executive compensation system of overseaslisted companies in developed countries such as the USA, and gives an account ofthe beneficial enlightenment and reference to the reform of executive compensationsystem of China’s state-owned listed companies.The seventh chapter talks about the direction and principles of the reform ofexecutive compensation system in state-owned listed companies. This chapter putsforward the fundamental direction and specific goals of the reform of executivecompensation system in our state-owned listed companies, and elaborates theprinciples of the reform of executive compensation system in state-owned listedcompanies.The eighth chapter is the innovation and Countermeasures of executivecompensation system in state-owned listed companies. This chapter discusses thescientific standards of establishing executive compensation system in state-ownedlisted companies and optimizes the structure model of executive compensationsystem in state-owned listed companies, and finally puts forward suggestions ondeepening the reform of executive compensation system of state-owned listedcompanies.