Research On Influential Factors Of Executive Compensation In China’s State-owned Listed Corporation

With the separation of ownership and right of management of enterprises, theprincipal-agent problem has concerned the enterprises of the world. The executivecompensation as a core issue of agency relation will influence the performance andprospect of enterprises. Therefore, establish a reasonable and effective salary systemis a necessary measure to solve the agency problem. One the one hand, this systemcould restrict on the self-serving behavior of the executives effectively. On the otherhand, it could increase the enthusiasm of executives to strive for the maximizing thefortune of shareholders and stakeholders. With the breakout of financial crisis in2008, the unreasonable compensation of executives has drawn wide attention fromthe world and it becomes a key issue of theoretical research. The governments haveproclaimed a series of policies and measures to limit the payment since2009. Limitthe payment of executives is both the concern of the people and the problemdemanding prompt solution of the government in China. Therefore, research on theinfluential factors of state-owned listed companies and establish an effectivecompensation incentive system has great practical significance of enterprises andsociety.This essay is on the normative and empirical study, which has reviewed theresult findings and theoretical hypothesis about influential factors of executivecompensation both abroad and at home. On the basis of normative study, this essayselected791samples of state-owned listed companies from the main board of thestock market of Shanghai and Shenzhen, used EXCEL and SPSS to sift the mass data and give a descriptive statistical analysis. The statistical analysis findings showthe situation of executive compensation in state-owned listed companies fromindustry and region. This essay uses the multiple linear regression models and givesPearson correlation and regression analysis to study the selected variable indexes’influence on executive compensation in state-owned listed companies. The latestfinancial data which published by state-owned listed companies are used as the dataresources; the empirical analysis findings could better reflect variable indexes’influence on executive compensation in state-owned listed companies. From theempirical analysis, here comes to the conclusion: executive compensation instate-owned listed companies is positive correlate to the performance, the size of acompany, the development of a region but negative correlate to the business risks.