The Study Of The Regulatory Mechanism On Government Financial Support Enterpreise Funds

Government expenditure can play a catalytic role on economic development,social justice and ecosystem.In recent years,the fiscal expenditure of governments are growing.However,it is accompanied by problems that governments are short of fiscal aggregates and low efficiency of financial funds.The reason is that the regularly system of government spending is imperfect.it is common that government departments use their administrative powers to rent seeking,as well as corruption.Domestic and foreign scholars’ study of government financial support funds are most based on administration,economics and so on. But it needs further study by perspective of behavioral science about what government and enterprise should do and how to supervise the behaviors of government and enterprise in the process of fiscal spending.This paper is based on the principal-agent theory, government behaviors and enterprise behaviors in the process of government spending are analyzed.Assuming that the government and enterprises are rational agents,their own utility function or revenue function both maximize their goals. As financial supporters for capital’s agent,enterprises have the advantage of information.Government as a trustee of fiscal funds has monopoly advantage of administrative power.Information asymmetry between the two sides and inconsistency of the utility function can easily lead to opportunistic behaviors of both parties.Based on the principal-agent relationship between the government and the enterprises.In this paper,we explore the behaviors of the relationship and supervision mechanism between government and enterprises in the process of government financial support funds spending and draw the following conclusions.First of all, this article is based on the analysis of the principal-agent relation between the government and enterprises,building the theoretical model and theoretical assumptions among the government behaviors,enterprise behaviors and the performance of project which is supported, and doing hypotheses testing by using the metrological analysis method of structural equation model.The results are as following:Firstly,The behaviors of the government have impact on enterprises’ behaviors.It is found that the government rent-seeking behaviors make positive influence on adverse selection behaviors and the risk of moral hazard behaviors of enterprises while government supervision makes restrict effects.Secondly,the government behaviors influence the performance of the project which is supported.The study found that the government departments’ rent-seeking behaviors have a significant negative impact on the performance of the project which is supported.However,the supervision of the government behaviors achieves the opposite effects.Thirdly,the enterprise behaviors influence the performance of project which is supported.The study found that the moral risk of the enterprise behaviors of the negative effects by the supported project performance is significant while the adverse selection of the enterprise behaviors not.Secondly, in view of the governance mechanism of opportunism behaviors in the process of government fiscal spending, this paper uses the dynamic evolutionary game analysis method, exploring the behaviors evolution and stability of strategy between the government and enterprises.The results shows that increasing the punishment coefficient and establishing a mechanism for the reputational damage can effectively restrict opportunistic behaviors strategy of the government and the enterprises.In this paper, through the analysis on the government behaviors and the enterprise behaviors in the process of government spending, the corresponding regulatory proposals are from four aspects: First, implementing regulation of whole process including prior censorship, interim auditing and afterwards evaluation.Second, increasing the intensity of punishment. Establishing punishment mechanism such as administrative punishment, legal punishment, economic punishment and reputation punishment.Third, strengthening external supervision mechanism such as social supervision by public opinion, information disclosure system and the introduction of professional institutions.Fourth, using the financial professional of bank to construct a stereo management system including government,enterprises and banks.Innovation and contribution to the research in this paper, are mainly reflected in three aspects:Firstly, this paper made a supplement from the perspectives of research level of scholars about the government’s financial support.Most scholars analyze financial support fund from the perspective of administrative management and economics while this paper explores the behaviors which is due to information asymmetry between the government and enterprises from the perspective of behavioral science.This helps to supplement the existing research from the aspects of research perspectives.Secondly, as for research methods, this paper analyzes the behaviors relationship between government and enterprises by using quantitative analysis method of structural equation model, and using the dynamic evolutionary game analysis to explore supervision mechanism of government behaviors and enterprise behaviors.These make supplement on the existing research from the methodology.Thirdly, through the analysis of the government behaviors and enterprise behaviors in the process of government spending,it can be found that increasing the punishment coefficient and establishing a mechanism for the reputational damage can effectively restrict opportunistic behaviors strategy of the government and enterprises.Besides, this paper also puts forward to using the financial professional of banks to construct a stereo management system including government, enterprises and banks.It can also play a guiding role to governments financial support fund supervision from the aspect of practice.