Study On Governance Mechanism Of The Agency's Opportunistic Behaviors In Agent-construction System Project

Along with our country government investment system reform and the various provinces and cities of project implementation,the acting system formally implemented since 2004,the acting system as an important management model of government investment in public projects in improving the efficiency of government investment,curb "San Chao" problems,such as corruption has played an important role.However,due to the construction agency does not agree with the government's target of the client and other reasons,in the contract in the process of practice,the construction agency in pursuit of self-interest and opportunism behavior,such as imposing withholding information,jerry has hurt the government investment project management performance and the government and the social public interests,destroy the healthy development of the agent market.How to effectively deal with construction unit of the opportunism behavior,improve the management performance of acting system become a problem worthy of study.First of all,on the basis of literature analysis and theoretical analysis in this paper,the formation mechanism of opportunism behavior of construction agencies were studied.Then,using the case study method,analysis eight cases of our country projects,identify the agent construction units in the process of actual operation forms of opportunistic behavior.Secondly,based on government departments and the construction agency of the principal-agent relationship,this paper constructs the construction agencys exist opportunistic behavior and when he does not exist opportunistic behavior model,analysis the principal unit of government incentive strategy choice.The results show that,improve the investment savings ratio can effectively reduce the opportunism behaviors of the construction unit,raise the level of its productive effort.Finally,this paper uses evolutionary game theory analysis model,on the basis of full consideration of the dynamic characteristics of governance,and studies the principal unit of government supervision enterprises strategy choice and strategy selection of interactive mechanism,and influence the key factors to the stability of the system evolution process were analyzed.The research results show that by designing a reasonable incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can make the game system to(do not take opportunism behavior,not supervision)evolution of the strategy,promote government between clients and construction units to establish a good trust relationship of mutual benefit,improve the project overall revenue agent,agent mode advantage into full play.This article in view of the government investment agent opportunism behaviors of the enterprises in the project,the analysis of its mechanism and form recognition,on the basis of using the principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory from the governance way such as incentive mechanism,supervision mechanism is studied.The research results of this paper may enterprises governance of government departments to reasonably and effectively opportunism behavior,improve the effect of acting system implementation to provide a certain reference.