| China is the biggest coal consumer in the world, whose annual coal consumption accounts for about half of the world’s total coal consumption. Meanwhile, China’s thermal power installed capacity has reached about 70% of the national power installed capacity. Currently, coal and electric energy are still the key to China’s energy problems, hence, the improvement of coal industry and electricity industry is still the basis of China’s energy industry development. In 2015, the second round of electric power system reformation was officially launched, and then the Paris Climate Conference was successfully held, which will have a persistent effect on the development of China’s coal-thermal energy supply chain. In the meantime, China’s Energy "Thirteenth-Five-Year" Planning shows a new direction for total coal consumption and thermal power generation installed adjustment. Therefore, the development of coal-thermal energy supply chain, especially the problem of transaction stable matching and supply chain risk management, is an urgent problem. In my thesis, based on the current situation of the development of the coal-thermal energy supply chain in China, I analyze the problem of the transaction stable matching and risk management of the coal-thermal energy supply chain. The article is divided into ten chapters, the specific work is as follows:In Chapter 1, the background,4 purposes and 6 significances of my topic are introduced, and then the research framework, the technical route, the research difficulties, the key issues and the innovation points of my thesis are shown.In Chapter 2, based on the market situation and policy environment for the coal-thermal energy supply chain, a System Dynamics method is illustrated to describe the China’s coal-thermal energy supply chain in a form of System Dynamics (SD) model, which helps define the boundary for the following analysis, and lay a foundation for the research.In Chapter 3, to study the boundary when the trade happens between coal enterprises and thermal power enterprises in China, the concept of transaction-and-governance costs is defined, and Evolutionary Game Theory and Discrete Structural Analysis are employed to. The results show that:(1) theoretically, transaction and governance costs are the basis for both sides to make a valid decision when choosing the boundary; (2) technically, when making make-or-buy decisions, both enterprises not only need to calculate the probability and costs to make trading decisions, but also need to solve the long-term cost-savings problem according to specific assets of enterprises; (3) practically, when the specific assets of both coal enterprises and thermal power enterprises change, tactics will reflect three trends, namely the market, the hybrid and the hierarchy.In Chapter 4, first, the property and the governance structure of "coal transaction" are defined theoretically. Second, the deferred choice and refusal algorithm is optimized to design a mechanism suitable for coal transaction with respect to matching. Third, the concepts of score, potential profitability, intentional trust and elasticity for sorting preferences are illustrated, and Complex Adaptive System is used for boundary selection. Finally, through simulation, the theoretical assumptions, the feasibility of this algorithm and the plausibility of this model are verified. The results show that:(1) Efficiency ensures the efficient supply and output of enterprises, trust’ role is next to profit in the choice of partners. (2) When the coal enterprise’s score is higher than the power enterprise’s, power enterprise will tend to buy coal instead of make it; (3) to control and adjust the scale of coal industry, China should reasonably and moderately eliminate the coal enterprises with backward production capacity, and set some necessary barriers to market access through the power enterprises.In Chapter 5, according to imported coal that coal-fired power plants put into use, government will compensate the plants with Specialized Investment Funds. Six reasons of encouraging imported coal are summarized. The mathematical model is built for Incentive Compatibility Mechanism. Incentive compatibility constraint is designed to prohibit plants from misreporting, which means to prevent the high efficiency being report to be low. Through the evaluation of profits, social welfare and utility, plants have to input the imported coal at government’s desired level. Then by government’s incentives, plants are to develop overseas resources and gain revenues by using special funds. At this point, the government and the plants are forming a "principal-agent" relationship.In Chapter 6, the concept of "Supply Chain Risk Transferring-Spreading" are defined, and the Risk Transferring-Spreading is classified as "effect-oriented", "structure-oriented" and "process-oriented". Interpretative Structural Modeling and Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detection are employed to respectively build the models and discuss the mechanism of the structure-oriented and the process-oriented. The results show that:(1) structure-oriented transferring-spreading mainly reflects the structural relationship between risks, process-oriented transferring-spreading mainly illustrates the stakeholders’ risk priority on decision-making process; (2) the structure-oriented transferring-spreading will help distribute the risk indicators in mainly 8 levels which makes the institutional-legal risk and the economic cycle risk turn into the source of other risks; (3) with respect to the process-oriented transferring-spreading, the energy supply chain risk indicators are classified into 18 categories, and 9 risks that can affect the safety of coal-electricity energy supply chain are filtered out as well.In Chapter 7, with respect to the performance and risk management of Coal-Electricity supply chain risk management in China, the issues of Coal-theraml supply chain risk evaluation is focused. Based on defining the relationships among the supply chain sectors, using Value Driver Tree to sort out the risk sources, Coal-Electricity Supply Chain Risk Management Index System is built. Social questionnaires samples are collected to introduce a principal component analysis, and Structural Equation Modeling is employed. With respect to the weight of index, the factor loading and the path coefficient of risks are discussed at the same time. According to the Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation method, a model of Coal-thermal supply chain risk evaluation is built. The results show that: Currently, the main risk sources of China’s Coal-thermal supply chain are policy risks, accidental disasters and market demands. The enterprises in supply chain would evaluate the risks by using the C-ESCRE.In Chapter 8, firstly, the uncertainty, the risk and the robust optimization of supply chain are analyzed comprehensively, and the boundary of every department in supply chain is defined, and the "downside risk" is indicated as the key point in the risk management of coal-power energy supply chain in practice. Then the coal-thermal energy supply chain risk management model is built based on robust optimization, of which modeling idea is to provide useful and real decision support for value-based management of coal-electricity energy supply chain, and elaborates basic model, resulting function and decision model. Finally, the validity of this model is proved from the aspects of solution robustness, objective robustness and information robustness through a case-oriented numerical analysis and some quantitative indexes.In Chapter 9, energy security, environmental conservation and climate change are discussed with respect to the development of national economy. The PEST-SWOT analysis and the Porter’s Five Forces analysis are used to discuss strategic issues on coal-thermal supply chain carbon management in China. Then a collaborative mechanism is designed, and an ANP model for evaluation is built.In Chapter 10, the conclusions of the full thesis are summarized, and policy implications are put forward.
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