On The Voluntary Turnover’s Enfluential Factors Of Senior Managers Of Gem Board Listed Companies From The Perspective Of PE Investment

The emergence of China’s GEM board enrichening China’s capital market, provides a new financing channelsfor small and medium size innovative enterprises by attracting a lot of Venture Capital and Private Equity(PE). As carriers of management and technology, senior manager provides powerful engine to the development of small and medium size enterprises. But the turnover of senior manager has become a common phenomenon, which is not good for the boom of secondary market, as well as the stability and development of small and medium size enterprises. Study on the turnover behaviorof senior managers fromGEM board listed companies will provide some theoretic and empirical basis for perfecting relevant law and regulation of GEM board.The thesis first analyzes thevoluntaryturnover behaviorof senior managers from GEM board listed companies using principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, and constructs a signal game model to investigate the game process of senior managers’ voluntaryturnover. Then analyzes the direct acting factors of senior managers’ voluntary turnover, and puts forward the second authentication effects after investigating the screening and monitoring effects, authentication effects, reputationeffects of PE, and explores the mechanism of the impacts of PE to corporate performance and corporate valuation, and constructs the conceptual model of voluntary turnoverof senior managers from GEM board listed companies, putting forward corresponding research hypothesis. Finally the thesis builds a Logit model to examine the impacts of corporate performance, corporate valuation and corporate governance on the voluntary turnoverof senior managers, and uses trilogy to examine the mesomeric effect of corporate performance, corporate valuation after the empirical analysis of the impacts of PE on corporate performance and valuation. The main results show that:(1) The stock ownership incentive did not play a proper role due to the large proportion of family corporations among the China’s GEM board listed companies, causing severeprincipal-agent problem. Senior managers will resign in the right timeusing their information superiority, and reducing holding-shares to lock their benefits. Information asymmetryresults inadverse selections, as well as senior managers’ banalization or market exit in the long term.Signal from senior managers can not resolve the adverse selections among directors and senior managers, but the signal from externalstakeholders, such as PE, can play a role in revealing the type of senior managers, resolving the adverse selection problems(higher salary to senior managers of H type).(2) PE will enhance the corporate performance through strict screening before investment and persistent monitoring. Generally PE will lower under-pricing rate in a matural capital market through authentication effects and reputation effects. But PE will increase under-pricing rate in China’s second capital market due to second authentication effects caused by the lack of specialization and rationality of individual investors.(3) Good corporate performance has a negative impact on the voluntary turnover of senior managers from GEM board listed companies. False high corporate valuation will enhace the stock yield of senior managers from GEM board listed companies, and then has a positive impact on the voluntary turnover of senior managers. The size of board of directors has a negative impact on the voluntary turnover. PE can enhance the corporate performance and has a greater role with high proportion of shareholding. Non-state-owned, industry PE has an obvious adjusted effect on the relation between PE and corporate performance. PE has a positive impact on the corporate valuation. PE will enhance the probability of voluntary turnover of senior managers from GEM board listed companies. Corporate performance and valuation has an obvious mesomeric effect on the relation between PE and voluntary turnover of senior managers from GEM board listed companies.