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Affect The Mechanism Of The Replacement Model Of The General Manager Of China's Listed Companies And The Effect Of Empirical Research

Posted on:2008-01-28Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z J YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360278472015Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
CEO turnover is one of the most important decisions for the development of one corporation, such issue is widely researched by accounting and finance researchers oversea. CEO turnover can influence a lot of aspects of the corporation, Inside of the organization, it is the most influential management change. Outside of the organization, it is a signal of the development of the corporation for stakeholders, such as stokeholders, customers, suppliers , public and government. As a result, CEO turnover can influence economic, political enviroment and corporation performance.The research result of CEO turnover is very different. Ocasio(1994) suggested that there were four reasons, one was the differrence of the definition of the viariance,one was the differrence of methodology, one was the simplicity of the research methodology, the other was lacking of whole research structure. Based on prior researcher's theories and empirical results, we find that these research are all done in mature market economy. In order to do some research on CEO turnover in transition economy, this paper combine the literatures of agency theory, resource dependence theory, the pecking order theory, free cash flow hypothesis and CEO turnover influence corporation performance theory, and on the basis of which, a series of relative sub-studies are conducted.The aim of study I am to explore CEO turnover modes. Adopting case study, study I describe and analysis four Chinese listed companies' CEO turnover. The result show that we can not classify CEO turnover modes according to turnover reasons which published by listed company; different CEO turnover modes have significantly different reasons, the factors have effcet on forced turnover are lower performance, the shift of controlling rights and so on, however, the factors have effcet on voluntary turnover are the separation of chairmen of border and CEO from one individual, or having better development chance; different CEO turnover modes have significantly different corporation performance.Study II provides us a panorama of the Chinese listed companies' CEO turnover. We can see that from 2001 to 2004, Top three industries about the number of CEO turnover are Manufacturing,Telecommunications and Mixed industries; Top three industries about relative turnover rate are Media and culture, Telecommunications and Mixed industries; job re-arrangement, resignation and expiry of tenure are three mainly publish reasons; the difference between inside and outside is not significant; A deep analysis showed that age, education and tenure are will influence CEO turnover too.Based on logistic regression analysis and hierarchical regression analysis, Study III explored the affection mechanism of Chinese listed companies' CEO turnover modes. This study focused on the effects of corporation performance, corporation's Characteristics and CEO's Characteristics on CEO turnover. The research samples include Telecommunications and Mixed industries from 2001 to 2004. The results of logistic regression analysis show that (1) the effects of corporation performance on predesessor departures. RROAt-1, RROAt and RRt are highly negatively related tothe forced turnover, however, there was a positive relationship between RRt-1 and forced turnover; Only RRt had negative effects on voluntary turnover among fourperformance indicator. (2) the effects of corporation performance on the succession of successors.For each CEO turnover modes, there were positive relationships between accounting performance and inside successor, between market performance and outside successor. (3) the effects of corporation's Characteristics on predesessor departures. Industry and liability/asset ratio have positive impact on forced turnover, but have no impact on voluntary turnover; Company size, the stockholding rate of the biggest stockholder have negative impact on forced turnover, but have no impact on voluntary turnover; the stockholding characteristics of the biggest stockholder , percentage of ownership hold by director and supervisor have no impact on forced/ voluntary turnover. (4) the effects of corporation's Characteristics on the succession of successors. Company size has positive impact on inside successor; industry and the stockholding rate of the biggest stockholder have no impact on successor. (5) the effects of CEO's Characteristics on predesessor departures. CEO's age, dual position(held by the president and chief executive officer) have no impact on forced turnover, but have negative impact on voluntary turnover; CEO's tenure has negative impact on both forced turnover and voluntary turnover; there were no relationship between percentage of ownership hold by CEO and forced turnover , voluntary turnover. (6) the effects of CEO's characteristics on the succession of successors. CEO's tenure has positive impact on inside successor. The results of hierarchical regression analysis show that (1) controlling corporation performance and corporation's characteristics, CEO's tenure has still negative impact on forced turnover. (2) controlling corporation performance and corporation's characteristics, CEO's tenure, age and dual position have still negative impact on voluntary turnover. In order to understand the information of CEO turnover to corporate operating decision and performance, from analyzing Chinese listed companies such as Telecommunications and Mixed industries from 2001 to 2004, this research found that (1) take the companies with forced turnover for instance, the new CEO will take more conservative investment decision than the original CEO; as for the companies with voluntary turnover, the difference about investment decision between the new CEO and the original CEO is not significant. As for four modes, only forced/outside turnover mode which the new CEO will take more conservative investment decision than the original CEO. (2) As a result, after turnover, if the investment decision grows than before, the liability/asset ratio will fall afterward; if the investment decision is conservative, the liability/asset ratio will grows than before. (3) In the case of voluntary turnover, the accounting performance will worse than before; as for forced turnover, the accounting performance will better than before; a further analysis shows that, as for forced/inside and voluntary/outside modes, the difference about accounting performance between the new CEO and the original CEO is not significant. In case of forced/outside turnover mode, the accounting performance will better than before; as for voluntary/inside turnover mode, the accounting performance will worse than before. (4) In the case of market performace, the results are amost not significant. So we come up to carry on analysis from its fluctuation direction. From its fluctuation direction, we can find that no matter from forced or voluntary turnover modes, the market performance will worse than before. A further analysis shows that, from its fluctuation direction, no matter from forced or voluntary turnover modes, inside successor will cause higher maket performance; but outside successor will cause worse maket performance both forced and voluntary turnover modes.Finally, the main conclusions of this paper were summarized. The theoretical developments, practical implications as well as the directions for future research were discussed.
Keywords/Search Tags:Chinese listed company, CEO turnover, turnover mode, forced turnover, voluntary turnover, inside succession, outside succession
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