Research On The Construction Land Supply Behavior Of Local Government And Its Impact On Factor Mobility

In the economic decentralization system environment of China, local government is confronted with fierce competition of horizontal politics and vertical taxation, and the land supply policy is a powerful tool to deal with competition. For one thing, depended on the monopolizing position in the land market, the local government chooses commercial and residential land unsaturated supply mode, makes it unable to meet the demand and high-priced, fights for fiscal revenue to cater to the fiscal and taxation competition. For another thing, by agreement and precondition public land leasing to supply industrial land, local government strives for investment and develops economics to cater to the political competition. The special different priced land supply action takes shape, which is based on individual city. Under the highly decentralized economic mode, local government’s competition should think about the affection of the supply of construction land, at the same time relevant city. Viewed in terms of Game theory, is there game relationship in local government commercial and residential land supply? Is it reasonable in the price and quantity of industrial land supply so that low pricing strategies of industrial land in the aim of attracting capital and improving local economic growth? Is there any effect of local government construction land supply to other economic elements, such as capital and population? The above all should be considered. The dissertation concentrates on these problems, focused on the following five researches: local government commercial and residential land supply game theory, local government industrial land supply price’s rationality, local government industrial land supply quantity’s rationality, the effect of total local government construction land supply to capital flow, the effect of local government construction land supply structure to population mobility, the paper expects to perfect the theory system of the local government construction land supply and clear its political function. The main conclusion are as follows:1. The analysis of local government commercial and residential land supply game relationship. On the basis of spatial autocorrelation analytical method, the paper verifies the substitutional relation of local government commercial and residential land supply. Making use of various cities in Shandong Province commercial and residential land price and supply quantity data and econometrics analysis method, the article gains the supply function of Shandong Province commercial and residential land. Then on account of Game theory method and analysis mode, Shandong intra-regional commercial and residential land game relation pattern is studied by calculation. Results show that: In Shandong Province, cities’ governments don’t just consider of themselves in the commercial and residential land supply, but generally concern other cities’ situation. At the same time, there are large differences among the commercial and residential land supply game relation pattern—the commercial and residential land supply game relationship pattern under cities’ government is highly similar to the “leader-follower” mode. Residential lands supply game relationship pattern is very sophisticated, and has no obvious “leader”. There’re generally bidirectional solicitude relationships among local government residential land supply process.2. The rationality analysis of local government industrial land supply price. Using econometric analysis tool such as panel data causality test and regression analysis, the internal logic of the industrial land low-priced supply. At the same time, on account of finance and value rationality, two economic rationality judgments standards of lower local government industrial land price are put forward and came into use. Results show that: The industrial land low-priced supply has spillover effects and can bring the growth of fiscal revenue inside and outside of the budget and the rationality logically. From the side of the price rationality, it has its financial rationality at largely in lower-priced industrial land supply process among Shandong Province’ cities, and it is not a spare-no-expense non-rational competition. But supplying lower-priced industrial land hasn’t value rationality, which is the result of political incentives.3. The rationality analysis of local government industrial land supply quantity. With the key point of local government industrial land supply aim, taking whether the industrial land supply of local government can bring the increase of industrial economy output as the criteria of judgment, the paper analyzes the rationality of expanding the cities’ local government industrial land supply in Shandong Province, and the reasonable and the unreasonable industrial land supply expansion driving force on the conclusions of empirical study. Results show that: According to the differences of industrial economy output action mode, it can be divided into two styles in industrial land expansion: reasonable and unreasonable. There is certain unreasonable industrial land supply in Shandong Province, but in a stepwise decrease trend. In spatial distribution, there is sharp distinction between the unreasonable industrial land supply areas in Shandong Province. The unreasonable industrial land supply is mainly in the west and south(such as Dezhou, Liaocheng, Heze, Linyi etc.); other cities’ are less obvious. The unreasonable industrial land supply has been gradually eliminating in some areas after the year 2008. At the same time, reasonable industrial land supply expansion is mainly from the drive of economy and popularity, and the fiscal incentives are the irrationality’s.4. The influence of local government construction land supply quantity to capital flow. Modeling aggregate production function, this paper deduces the model of the land supply effect on the rate of capital return, and makes empirical analysis focusing on industrial sector. Results show that: There’re effects of industrial land supply quantity on regional capital return rate. Because the acceleration of industrial land supply quantity has an effect upon the per hectare capital stock’s, and the distinct per hectare capital stock from different areas produce different proportion contribution, and then affects the absolute level of capital return rate.5. The influence study of local government construction land supply structure to population mobility. By constructing a general equilibrium model containing local government, enterprises and residents, using the model solving and numerical simulation, putting forward questions and hypothesis, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of local government construction land supply structure to population mobility through threshold regression analysis method in Shandong Province. Results show that: The influence of local government construction land supply structure to population inflows is quite important, which is lower than it of population scale and urban location, but higher than infrastructure investment. The effect style of construction land supply structure to population inflows shows special inverted U shape and has obvious diversity under different scopes.The paper’s innovation is mainly reflected in the next three aspects:The first aspect is introducing new methods in local government commercial and residential land supply behavior research. Using Game theory and social network model in analyzing local government commercial and residential land supply behavior, based on relative data the paper models and solves the solicitude relationships in the commercial and residential land supply between cities, in order to put the local government commercial and residential land supply behavior research into regional level including several cities from single city level and bring the competition between cities into the analytical scope.The second aspect is opening new perspectives of the industrial land scale expansion rationality research. Regarding the local government industrial land supply aim as entry point, setting whether industrial land supply could promote the industrial economy output as criteria, putting panel data threshold regression analysis method to use, the paper investigates the impact of different land, capital element combination on economic growth diversity and analyzes the rationality of the industrial land scale expansion, joining the characteristics of China’s national conditions for the industrial land scale expansion rationality analysis.The third aspect is putting forward new questions about population flow’s influencing factor research. Through constructing a general equilibrium model containing local government, enterprises and residents, this paper comprehensively surveys the influence of local government land supply behavior on living and productive activities, and then researches the influence mechanism of local government land supply structure to population flow using model solution and numerical simulation.There are 24 charts, 38 tables and 142 references in this dissertation.