A Study On Mao-zedong's Strategy Of Uniting With America Against The USSR

Using techniques such as synthesis, case study, comparison, and based on Deng-xiaoping's diplomatic thought, this dissertation is aimed at a further research of Mao-zedong's diplomatic strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, with relations between ideology and national interest as the basic theoretical perspective. The innovation and the uniqueness of this dissertation lie in its exploration of the essence, influences, unexpected outcomes, features, prerequisites, and constraints in Mao-zedong's strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, based on lots of historical materials and through the study of the relations between Mao-zedong's strategy on the one side, and some historical cases on the other, which had something to do with the strategy, direct or indirect. In other words, this is a survey out of different historic profiles. Such an attempt can broaden field of vision in this traditional research area, and deepen the understanding of meanings and historic place of this diplomatic revolution set out by Mao-zedong.Historical cases concerned in the dissertation are as follows:Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations, Indochina war in 1960s and 1970s, the diplomatic tactics of 'one line' and 'one sweep' put forward first by Mao-zedong in 1973 and carried out henceforth, the detent in 1970s, the great triangular configuration among China, America and the Soviet, Mao-zedong's diplomacy for world revolution, politics at home during the 'cultural revolution', and the strategic theory of the three worlds inaugurated by Mao-zedong in 1974.The fundamental cause for Sino-American strategic cooperation had been first-place Soviet threat to both nations. The threat itself, however, was insufficient for these two nations to go together. Taiwan issue refers to China's core interest, and it was impossible for Mao-zedong to sacrifice the supreme principle of one China for the cause of uniting with America against the USSR. The issue was also America's one of the most interests in the Asian-pacific area, and it had been directly related to the highly ideologicalized home politics and foreign policies in America. It was impossible, too, for America to give up Taiwan completely for cause of unification with China to balance the USSR. For the common and supreme interests of against or to balance the USSR, the mutual compromise was inevitable. To America, the compromise was the open recognition of one China principle, and the promises to break the diplomatic relation with, denounce the treaty on common defense signed with and the complete retreat of its army from Taiwan, which were offered openly or privately but bound. To China, the concessions were the maintenance of strategic cooperation with America, despite the facts of the on-going American-Taiwan official relation, keeping of US army in Taiwan, the continuation of the treaty on common defense with Taiwan in an indefinite future, and the American refusal to give up its obligations to defend Taiwan. Partly because the administration under Nixon and Ford refused to keep their promises mentioned above, which they still recognized, Mao-zedong had to reject some of the military interchange projects offered by America, hence weakening of effects of Sino-American strategic cooperation to some degrees. Mao-zedong's policy to give consideration to both Chinese security and unification interests represented his deep understanding of the Chinese national interests.The on-going Indochina war in the early 1970's meant Chinese and American actors as mutual enemy, though indirectly. The fact more or less blocked mutual strategic cooperation between two sides directed at the Soviet. Having understood the defensive motivation for American involvement in this war, and its sincere motive to go out of Indochina, and having faced nearly irrevocable trend of Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, and the Vietnamese ambition to control the whole Indochina especially, Mao-zedong still kept up supporting Vietnamese attempts to unify their country against America and revolutions in all three Indochina states heart and soul. The policy was mainly out of world revolution, a pure ideological consideration. This cutting policy of supporting Vietnamese cause of unification against America and uniting with America against USSR concurrently, while helped Vietnamese just cause of national unification, and defended the supreme interest of the Chinese national security, contributed objectively to the realization of Soviet attempt to encircle China from the southern side, partly neutralizing the strategic effects of uniting with America against the USSR in fact. However, Mao-zedong's subtle policy adjustment toward American-Vietnamese peace talks at its final stage, helped partial realization of American motive to retreat from the war and save the face at the same time, making it possible for him to put forward the diplomatic tactics of 'one line' and 'one sweep' to deepen his strategy of uniting with America against the USSR.The tactics of 'one line' and 'one sweep' was a policy aimed at building up an international united front against the USSR, contributing to Chinese security interests and the world revolution as possible as it could. As a means for strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, it was a policy to contain and isolate the USSR with Chinese characteristics. The tactics heightened China's international place and realized the intentions of isolating the USSR and of blocking its geopolitical expansion to some extent. However, because Mao's estimation of the Soviet threat wasn't in conformity with interests of many nations, Mao's motive to isolate the USSR failed on the whole. With regard to the perspective of relations between ideology and national interest, the failure resulted from his ideology to divide frontline with the criterion of against USSR, which regarded USSR as top threats both to world revolution and world peace, and a socio-imperialist country more aggressive and risky than America. The judgment was not all true.The detent constituted direct obstacles to the failure of 'one line' and 'one sweep'. During 1970s, out of their security interests which were not completely fit for Chinese one, their own knowledge of Soviet threats, which was less ideological and more realistic, and desire to avoid nuclear catastrophe shared with Soviets in common, America, western Europe and Japan all kept a detent policy toward the USSR for about ten years under the structure of the cold war. The maintenance and part success of this policy partly resulted from American more initiative place than China in the Sino-American-Soviet triangular configuration. The chief reason for America's more initiative place came from Mao's strongly uncompromising standing toward the USSR on ideological issues other than relations between nations. This standing lessened flexibility in China's policies toward the two superpowers. Because of lack of enough flexibility, China lost the most initiative place it would have and actually had taken in the triangular configuration, hence weakening of maximum effects of strategy for uniting with America against the USSR. A partial desalination of ideology on world revolution had been an indispensable prerequisite for Mao-zedong to cooperate strategically with the former top ideological foe. Mao-zedong, however, never gave up his insistent pursuit of world revolution, keeping up aiding anti-governmental armed and revolutionary forces in some countries, supporting almost all anti-Soviet forces in the world. The support of anti-Soviet forces had unified logics of world revolution and national security to some extent. However, diplomacy for world revolution alienated China from some countries Mao's tactics of'one sweep'wanted to unite or neutralize, thus blocked maximization of efficiency of his strategy. The traditional ideology stressing on war and revolution both had made Mao to refrain from concrete military cooperation with America to some extent, and had provided his strategy against the USSR with a revolutionary unified front, which had proved to be an effective way to defend national interest. The line of'cultural revolution'stressing on anti-revisionism, under the particular historical context, had both legitimized and weakened his strategy.Partly out of reflections on his tactics of'one line'and of his revolutionary diplomacy, Mao's strategic theory of three worlds stressed anti-hegemonism more than anti-imperialism, representing his further thought of relations between ideology and national interests, and his primary knowledge of the on-going multi-polar trend and the dawning era theme of peace and development in the world. The thought of giving up dividing frontlines according to social system thoroughly was in conformity with the logic of uniting with America against the USSR. The obvious policy orientation of stress on Soviet threat much more than America threat provided his strategy of uniting with America against the USSR with a defense that was less ideological and indirect.In conclusion, the Sino-American mutual compromise on Taiwan issue offered a pre-condition for strategy of uniting with America against the USSR. Mao-zedong's policies toward Indochina issue, and his insistence upon revolutionary diplomacy and'the cultural revolution'had provided the strategy of uniting with America against the USSR with both prerequisites and constraints, all representing the complexity of influence upon the strategy of uniting with America against the USSR by the traditional ideology. The improvement of Chinese national security, the rising of Chinese international status and the America's most initiative place in the triangular relationship had been all impacts and outcomes of this strategy. Geo-politically, the essence of the strategy was a quasi-alignment with America under the triangular configuration. From the point of ideology Mao had faith in, the essence was a revolutionary unified front. He had never given up the revolution in his understanding. The two great features of the strategy were tacit agreement and only principles. The tacit and the principal both originated from stalemate in Taiwan issue. On Chinese side, the two features had something to do with the limits from traditional ideologies, too. On the whole, this diplomatic strategy was outcome of Mao's wise and incomplete diplomatic revolution, weakened by this incompleteness, too. The wisdom lay in the fact that it was an example of non-ideological diplomacy in practice. The incompleteness lay in the fact that in theoretic explanation of this strategy he had failed to insist upon the superiority of national interests over ideological interests persistently, and that the ideological diplomacy and'the cultural revolution'he had never denounced had blocked the maximization of efficiencies of the strategy for uniting with America against the USSR. All of these incompleteness originated from both limits imposed upon him objectively by historical surroundings and his conscious choices. Under the particular historical context, Mao's cutting tactics of separating the Taiwan issue, his Indo-china policies, revolutionary diplomacy and the line of'cultural revolution'from the strategy for uniting with America against the USSR had decreased the interferences with this strategy as possible as could be. The tactics represented both Mao-zedong's wisdom and limitations. The three essences of Deng-xiaoping's diplomatic thought, i.e., supremacy of national interests, refusal of ideological diplomacy, and independence with the initiative in one's own hands and nonalignment, were, to a great extent, based on his reflections on achievements and limitations in Mao-zedong's strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, and Mao's other diplomatic policies, strategies and tactics having something to do with the strategy discussed in this dissertation.