A Philosophical Approach To Mental Abnormality

The examination of Historical facts and views about mental abnormalities suggests that abnormalities are differently judged in different times and by different criteria. Those criteria go far beyond biological and physical dimensions, social-cultural, moral, behavioral and mental considerations are also widely invoked. Moreover, mental abnormalities or abnormal mentalities are features not only of individual persons, but also of social groups or communities and of historical ages. However, some artists and scientists full of creativity often behave in a strange or abnormal way. They are usually taken not to be "abnormal", but to be "supernormal", because the works of art and scientific discoveries created by them are taken to be important for human welfare. The supernormal effects are results of activation or replacement of some parts of brain's function. Abnormalities of collective mentality may be identified as all modes of collective behaviors of a small group, a nation, or a country, to promote the group's interests which are at odds with its social-historical environment as a whole. Mental abnormalities of individual persons may be identified as all modes of behaviors which do not accord with current customs of most people's behaviors, such behavioral manifestations are jointly effected by genetic factors and environmental pressures (including social and natural environments) which lead to bodily (especially the brain's) damage and malfunction. The patient is typically poor in social adaptation and suffers from internal pain.Physicalism has long been implicit in early philosophical approaches to mental abnormalities as well as philosophy of mind in general. Its full-fledged form derives from mechanic physicalism initially developem in Descartes' dualism. Philosophers of Vienna Circle suggested in 1930s that science can be unified in terms of physicalism and mental phenomena reduced tophysiological and physical behaviors or movements within the framework of behaviorism whose insight into the problem of mind/body provides a theoretical foundation both for reductive and non-reductive physicalism. In order to have a comprehensive and justifiable understanding and explanation of mental phenomena and a plausible answer to the problem of mind-body, an acceptable physicalism has to take two steps: first, a basic confidence in the development of physical sciences; second, a synthetic theory integrating "environment, culture and behavioristic insights" , a fused theory of " humanism" and "functionalism".Physicalism integrated as above can offer a number of philosophical insights into mental abnormalities when used in the approach to mentally abnormal phenomena such as neurosis, depression and schizophrenia.The lessons taught by behaviorism are as follows: (1) any abnormal mentality is caused partly by repeated abnormal stimulations which are strengthened to form a habit, and partly by mentally abnormal reactions; (2) the overt manifestations of abnormalities are abnormal behaviors and the mental processes underlying them is only temporary and tentative explanations of those abnormal behaviors. The two lessons together suggest that abnormalities are to be treated mainly by means of behavior-adjustment and drug-cure.From the perspective of functionalism, the mental abnormalities can be identified with a sort of functional states of brain. To see consciousness as a kind of functional states is completely in line with materialism with respect to mind-body problem. A further step is to offer an appropriate verbal description of the functional states of mental abnormalities. In addition, to take a functional stance implies that we shall describe mental abnormalities in terms of identifiable inputs and outputs, which provide us with a new way of thinking of the cause and mechanism of mental abnormalities. What's more, multi-realizability of a function indicates that various clinic symptoms of mental abnormalities may have same cause or mechanism.Integrated physicalism can provide a relatively comprehensive explanation of all kinds of mental abnormalities for their causes, mechanisms and forms. It can play the role of a guiding line for clinic treatment, point up the road ahead for the resolution of some complicated theoretical problems concerning abnormal mentalities. First, physicalism proceeds from mind-body relationship in the way of reductionism, the mental is reduced to and identified with the physical. We are thus assured of that mental abnormalities are not a class of phenomena which can exist in themselves independently of body structures and features. Mental abnormalities must be a class of supervenient phenomena, and consequently have some neural abnormalities as their correlations. Second, although reductionism goes on the right way, the reduction is by no means accomplished in details. The mental is of a phenomenal independence to some extent. So we may at the moment accept expediently the interaction of mind and body with each other. Therefore, bodily abnormalities are bound to have some kind of mental correlations which are not necessarily abnormal for the reason that the content and present criteria of bodily and mental abnormalities are different. Thirdly, mental abnormalities may cause bodily abnormalities but not necessarily so for the same reason. An analysis of mental abnormalities in terms of qualia, a resistant subject in contemporary philosophy of mind which involves a number of theoretically fundamental orientations, leads to some helpful conclusions. (1) what keep us from admitting the qualia such as pain as real is the propositional attitude "I believe that I have a pain", while the concept belief rejected as scientifically inscrutable by eliminative materialists; (2) it is a hard fact that there is conscious experience without a body, so no abnormal mentalities without abnormal functioning of body; and (3) it is also the case that mental abnormalities treated as qualia are of weaker supervenience, but internal mental abnormalities is accessible only through a careful consideration of overt behaviors and environments. From the viewpoint of qualia, mental abnormalities are intentional, what is characteristic of mentalexperiences as depression, anxiety ana compulsion at tne dimension 01 quana are intentional, and therefore fully propositional in content and intended, but a phyisalist would suggest that intentionality and qualia cannot exist in themselves independently of the physical states of the body, no qualia witout body or brain, and that each intentional state or qualia must have a physical state correlative to it. A distinctive feature of John Searl's theory of intentionality consists in his appeal to a external world in his account of intentionality. if we take mental abnormality as a intentional state , it must be a state without fitting relation with the external world and society, just like a word without reference to external objects. Mental abnormality is usually a personally internal state, a set of abnormalities, including reasoning and belief abnormalities. All of such abnormalities can be explained in the framework of physicalism. psychological investigation and medical treatments indicate that physicalism in the philosophy of mind promising and a progressive program of reseach. Psychological consultation and treatment at present times take the line "psychological means first and physical means second", my approach shows that the priority should be reversed to be "physical means first and psychological means second" ?Physicalism offers us a comprehensive explanation and understanding of abnormal mentalities. However the details of the mechanism of brain with respect to abnormal mentalities or psyhe remain to be made clear. Many things have to be done by further development of natural sciences. It must be conceded that physicalism has its own problems, and the problem of free will is such one.