A Study On Kant's Transcendental Imagination

In the history of ideas in Western, imagination has always been a very importantconcept. The fundamental definition of imagination is the faculty of forming images.Plato in fact has been the first philosopher who introduced imagination in the field ofphilosophy. Imagining something was considered the lowest faculty of knowledge.Aristotle has taken the imagination as an elusive and intriguing power of the mindmediating between sensation and thought. Kant has undertaken systematic researcheson imagination during the pre-critique period. In the first Critique he has broughtimaginations of one kind into play,and has shown its epistemological role in theconstitution of experience, which is transcendental imagination.The two main tasks in The Critique of Pure Reason by Kant focus on theverification of scientific knowledge and the criticism to metaphysics, which wasdesigned to accomplish the tasks through inspecting how synthetic judgments a prioriare possible. Kant's theory of the doctrine of transcendental imagination came intobeing the moment when he answered the question about how pure natural science ispossible and its purpose was to serve as Transcendental Deduction of pure concept;however, its substantial consequence is to obtain the solution to the problems ofintuition and concept. The direct connection relates to whether or not TranscendentalDeduction stands or falls,while the latter determines the utmost accomplishment ofcriticism. As a result,transcendental imagination plays a vital role in the firstCritique.Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presenceintuition. It can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding,belonging to sensibility on the one hand, and is still an exercise of spontaneity on theother. Therefore it can accords with the categories and be up to determining thesensibility a priori, for the transcendental synthesis of imagination can realize thecombination of intuition and categories. Kant has mentioned the role oftranscendental imagination in Transcendental Deduction and schematism as well.However, there are two diversified connotations in the two versions of theTranscendental Deduction about the relationship between transcendental imaginationand understanding. Different commentators might thereafter come to interpretationsof various sorts about it.In the first publishing version of A-edition's Transcendental Deduction,transcendental imagination has been regarded as a blind though indispensablefunction of the soul,and belongs to the category of the third faculty. Kant's A-editiondeduction has been patched up by versions of different periods,through which wecan discover his thinking traces or clues. In the early period, Kant has made a cleardistinction about the three subjective sources of cognition: sense, imagination andapperception. For one thing, the role of sense is to form manifold of representations;for another, the function of apperception is to provide unity;and then the synthesis ofimagination serves as the third faculty, which could connect both of them. The theoryof the doctrine of threefold synthesis is a significant exertion to realize the synthesisof imagination, and in various modes of synthesis,the synthesis of imaginationdominates a key position, in which imagination as a blind faculty of synthesis bringsthe combination of representations to concept. In his doctrine of threefold synthesis,Kant has referred to the presentational formation of the time and space, and henceascertained extra-concept synthesis of imagination of one kind. Despite themoment when he describes synthesis of imagination as synthesis under rules onseveral occasions, Kant would more than often highlight the mediation role thatimagination plays in between intuition and concept. Nevertheless, there is aapparently strong inclination that imagination may be regarded as the third facultybetween sensibility and understanding in A-edition, which would predict theup-coming contradiction raised by Kant, concerning about the faculty distinction ofcognition.In B-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant has clearly indicated thatsynthesis of imagination is a function of understanding. Compared to A-edition,there exist two distinctions: for one thing, Kant has made a clear distinction betweenintellectual synthesis and figurative synthesis,in which the latter is, in reality,synthesis of imagination—synthesis is no longer regarded as the unique function ofimagination;for another figurative synthesis is understanding's first application toobjects of intuition of sensibility, in some cases, Kant points out directly that thespontaneity synthesis of imagination and the synthesis of understanding are in naturethe same thing.In contrast to the differences existing in the two versions, Kant has not modifiedthe concept of imagination about schematism. In the schematism chapter, Kant hasdiscussed the mediation role of transcendental imagination from the perspective ofthe power of judgment. Understanding is the faculty of rules,while applying rules isthe faculty of the power of judgment— as is defined clearly, the power of judgmentis the faculty of subsuming something under rules, and if it is possible to realizesubsumption, there must be a third thing between an object and the rule, and this isthe schema. A transcendental time-determination stands in homogeneity with thecategory on the one hand, and with the appearance on the other. As a result, it can bethe mediation for the application of categories in appearance. The understanding doesnot in itself bring forth the schemata,and the schema is always only a product of theimagination in any time. Schema is a realistic form of combination for understandingand sensibility. The schematism chapter in fact provides another interpretation for thefunction of imagination.Kant presents diverse descriptions of imagination in two editions ofTranscendental Deduction, which has allured commentators' attention. But to themajority of commentators, the spontaneity of imagination differs from thespontaneity of understanding in that the former carries through synthesis in intuition,so imagination as the third faculty or as the faculty of understanding makes a slightdifference. What really counts is that imagination can undertake and accomplish themediating mission between sensibility and understanding, which is the very genuineconnotation of transcendental imagination. However, Heidegger's research hasdisclosed the other aspect of Kant, and all of sudden made it even more important toshow the distinction between the two versions.Heidegger has restated the interpretation of imagination as the third faculty inthe A-edition, as a result, he has made Kant's connotation of transcendentalimagination change. On the part of Heidegger, since intuition and concept belong todifferent categories, and can be integrated with each other, it logically calls forsomething of a certain kind of "common boot", whose concept in itself reveals ormarks the distinction as well as the coordination of their function. Heidegger holdsthe belief that imagination is what Kant means the very "common boot" ofsensibility and understanding. Gibbons, to some extent, approves of Heidegger'sperspectives,who shows clearly that the division between intuition and concept isone that is meant to be overcome—both refer to Kant's original synthetic unity;possess certain adaptability of each to the other,and it is not necessarily the casethat the imagination should be the third thing. Instead, they are the corporateconfiguration of the both.Perhaps Heidegger and Gibbons have thought of another question raised byKant—that is, why the intuition and concept could be integrated together. This issuehas directly caused Kant's oscillation between two standpoints, for if sensibility andunderstanding belong to totally two different faculties, there must have been the thirdthing that could carry through the inter-communication between them. Now that wehave only two faculties of knowledge—sensibility and understanding,then, logicallythere could not have permitted the emergence of the third faculty. So the possibilityfor both to communicate with each other lies in the fact that both of them possesscertain common root, the position to which Heidegger and the sort have held on.Such inconsistency has been brought about by the internal paradox of Kant'ssystem. Therefore, we can detect that there are two tendencies or inclinations in Kant:on the one hand Kant insisted on the absolute distinction between intuition andconcept, and still pointed out that there was the factor of synthesis for intuition on theother. Furthermore, it is quite clearly demonstrated in the theory of the doctrine ofthreefold synthesis. In the B-edition, Kant exhibits clearly the distinction of theforms of intuition and formal intuition. So both perspectives can be deduced fromKant's doctrine and show some relevant evidences in it, while either of them mightrespectively command only one certain aspect. The two different viewpoints maydemonstrate a genuine conflicting or contradictory Kant.