| Heidegger's method of formal indication has attracted the attentions of academia since the nineties of the twentieth century, but the basic characteristic of Heidegger's thinking has not totally been outlined as method. It is surely very difficult to depict this kind of characteristic on the whole, if the totality of Heidegger's thinking must be concerned with his thinking during his early Freiburg period, his period of Being and Time, and his late period. Furthermore, with the rigid academic norms, our grasp of a philosophical thinking could easily become a grasp of an object that is present-at-hand, and Heidegger's thinking can never be such an object essentially.If we are to interpret and explain Heidegger's thinking appropriately, we must first let it flash out through our authentic reading of his texts, and become deeply familiar with it. Only when the flashing is frequent and strong enough, we can then turn to grasp it normally, and re-construct it with normal academic conceptions. We must also make this re-construction itself hold a possibility of destructing and transcending itself, and indicate Heidegger's thinking as such for us, because this re-construction could easily make Heidegger's thinking an object that is present-at-hand, and distort it. In this way, our grasping of Heidegger's thinking may need to repeat the re-construction and destruction again and again, so that our 'production' thus re-constructed is able to let Heidegger's thinking emerge undistortedly.Using the mode of 'flashing-reconstruction-destruction-...', I have attained such an insight that Heidegger's phenomenology as method is itself destruction and indication, and because of the unity of the two, I also name the characteristic 'destruction-indication'. According to this insight, Heidegger's early thinking, his thinking embodied in Being and Time, and his late thinking is all the destruction-indication. By such insight, we can both resolve the problem of the unity of his thinking in his different periods and also depict his thinking totally. We can thus both penetrate the essence of his thinking and also understand its theological significance better.It is also by depicting the basic characteristic of Husserl's phenomenology, which can be traced back to German classical philosophy, and which can be called the 'basic characteristic of pre-Heidegger's phenomenology', that I reach the above insight. The first part of this dissertation is thus about the basic characteristic of pre-Heidegger's phenomenology.In the first part, I first investigate the renewal of 'phenomenon', the birth of 'phenomenology', and the seven kinds of significations of the 'phenomenology' in the times of German classical philosophy. Then I analyze Husserl's alteration to German classical phenomenology, his criticism of positivism, and his reducing science-world to life-world. But this reduction is not the final one, because the life-world still belongs to natural world, on the basis of which, Husserl could not make philosophy a really rigorous science. Therefore, I then describe his eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction, through which, the essence and the origin of the life-world (natural world) can be gained. These two reductions plus life-world reduction together constitute the characteristic of reduction of Husserl's phenomenology. But it also has another equal basic characteristic, which is the one of construction. I then describe Husserl's construction of time, sense, perception, inter-subjectivity, natural world (life-world), world horizon, and science-world. Through all these discussions mentioned above, we have disclosed the characteristics of reduction and construction of Husserl's phenomenology. These two characteristics are opposite with respect to their directions, but they are also the same essentially, so that I finally characterize Husserl's phenomenology with the 'reduction-construction'.This basic characteristic is pre-characteristic of Heidegger's phenomenology. It is just by inheriting from and alteration to Husserl's reduction-construction phenomenology, that Heidegger posed his own phenomenology. In second part of this dissertation, I investigate how Heidegger inherited from and broke through Husserl's reduction-construction phenomenology during his early Freiburg period. For Heidegger, Husserl still dealt with theoretical objects in theoretical ways, but the most primordial thing is pre-theoretical, therefore, this part first analyses the concrete academic relationship between Heidegger and Husserl, especially how Heidegger began with Husserl and then advanced into (and also went back into essentially) pre-theoretical sphere by pre-theoretical manner through his 'experience of lectern' and 'experience of question'. The pre-theoretical manner then became the method of formal indication, which not only makes us go from the content sense of a phenomenon into the relation sense of it, but more importantly also makes us into the enactment sense and the temporalizing sense. Such formal indication is not only indication towards a pre-theoretical sphere, but also destruction to theoretical objects. Furthermore, the formal indication also has a hermeneutical dimension. In this way, preliminarily, Husserl's 'reduction' has changed into Heidegger's 'destruction', and Husserl's 'construction' into Heidegger's 'indication', and the reduction-construction phenomenology thus into destruction-indication phenomenology.But, the method of formal indication just aims at the enactment of man's existence during Heidegger's early Freiburg period. The question of Being in general is not really formulated until the period of Being and Time. In the third part, I first analyze how Heidegger surpassed Husserl's two kinds of conceptions of Being related to consciousness, which are the Being as truth and the Being as copulative, and formulated his own question of Being. Then, I investigate Heidegger's explication of the question of Being in his Being and Time, which is also related with the questions of Dasein's basic state of Being, the relationship between Dasein's Being and the Being in general, and the outline of questioning Being in general. Then, I review the significance of the outline, especially the method of destruction-indication embodied by it, and the destructive-indicative characteristic of both the language and the conceptions of Being and Time. Finally, I discuss Heidegger's further interpretation of his method of formal indication during the period of Being and Time, which involves the formal indicative of both the philosophical conceptions and the Dasein's existence itself, and a series of formal indications among beings, anxiety, nothing, and Being.In fourth part, I try to resolve the problem of unity of Heidegger's 'formal indication' and his 'phenomeno-logy' by analyzing his conceptions such as 'phenomenon' and 'phenomenology'. This is the most difficult one of all problems I deal with, and here, along with Heidegger, I may make some unspoken but most important thing spoken to some extent. Intimately related with this problem, are such problems as the formal distinguishing between 'phenomenon' and 'appearance', the significance of this formal distinguishing, all kinds of different conceptions of 'phenomenon', the signification of the '-logy' of "phenomenology', the anticipatory formal conception of phenomenology, the phenomenon of phenomenology, and the final significance of the distinguishing between 'phenomenon' and 'appearance'. After clarifying such problems, we can approximately resolve the following very difficult problems: Why are 'phenomenon' and 'appearance', and 'showing' (zeigen) and 'announcing' (melden) often upside-down? How are 'showing' (zeigen) and 'announcing' (melden) connected with 'indication' (Anzeige)? How are 'phenomeno-logy' and 'formal' 'indication' united? Why does Being as the phenomenon of phenomenology appear or announce itself? What does the 'fulfilled' 'phenomenology' do? After approximately resolving these difficult problems, 1 finally in this part discuss the definition of phenomenology and the basic components of it connected with Heidegger's The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927). These things exhibit once again Heidegger's alteration to and breaking through Husserl's reduction-construction phenomenology.In fifth part, I deal with Heidegger's late texts, in order to exhibit that his late thinking also belongs to destruction-indication phenomenology, and interpret ultimately his destruction-indication as authentic thinking. The first chapter of this part explores the transformation of Heidegger's thinking of Being from Being and Time to Introduction to Metaphysics, and his etymological analysis of Being, and also his discussion about how to indicate the essence of Being through the indication of beings, and then reviews his destruction to traditional metaphysics, and then discusses his 'Ereignis', the most important conception in his late thinking, being involved with its indicatively and dependently genetic characteristic, and with the problems of interpretation and translation of it. The second chapter exhibits the richness and colorfulness of formal indication in Heidegger's late texts, by analyzing his thinking about original hermeneutics, language-Saying, trace-hinting, art-opening, poetic dwelling, thing's thinging, and the limit of science. The third chapter views such rich and colorful formal indications as authentic thinking for Heidegger. Such thinking is not calculative thinking, but contemplative thinking or reflection. It is a thinking that opens world, shelters earth, protects the unity of earth, sky, gods, and mortals, follows that which withdraws, and responds to that which calls. Such thinking is the most urgent thing in our times, and its task is to think back the most worthy of but never thinking of unconcealment. This revealing-concealing unconcealment cannot be represented. It is a mysterious region. It is that-which-regions (Gegnet). The nature of authentic thinking is just nearing that-which-regions non-willingly and destructively, and this nearing is also just waiting upon, in-dwelling (Inst(a|¨)ndigkeit), enduring, thanking, and returning, which are based on that-which-regions. Authentic thinking is essentially 'releasement' (Gelassenheit).In final part, I investigate Heidegger's destruction and indication to traditional Christian theology. I begin with his 'home-world' in chapter 1. The home-world is both an actual world and a country of his thinking. For Heidegger, his home-world was first equal to Catholic world, but then they were separated from each other, and even Heidegger himself was divorced from Catholicism and began to think about religion in his own way. In chapter 2,I explore Heidegger's interpretation of primordial Christian experience and authentic religious life, and his destruction to Augustine's theology, exercising his method of formal indication during his early Freiburg period. In chapter 3, I fist examine Being and Time from its religious background, its religious significance, its Christian impetus, and its destruction to Christian theology, then analyze Heidegger's definition of theology (theology is in the end a non-objectifying existentiell [existenziell] thinking based on faith itself), and of the relationship between philosophy and theology (philosophy can give theology a 'foundation' or a formal indication), and finally point out his heathen and heterodox tendency. In chapter 4, I first investigate Heidegger's more radical destruction to traditional Christianity and its onto-theo-logical foundation, and then explicate his new god and new theology, with respect to which, he established a distinguished relationship between man, god and the holy. According to his new theology, god is no longer a personal god, but a god's godding, a last god that needs the longest preparing, a passing god that can never halt, and a beginning god that is deepest.
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