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Theoretical Analysis And Institutional Arrangement Research On Government Economic Monitoring

Posted on:2003-10-10Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:L JiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360065950684Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The Government Economics has been in an un-substitutable position in making up market failure, since in whichever country, only the competitive parties cannot account for the whole market economic development. Even the low-efficiency in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been known to all, the existence of government economics still has its external cause, the SOEs will still exist and develop in a long and maybe unending period of time. The point is to increase the efficiency in government so that the Pareto efficiency and the secure of state-owned assets (SOAs) can be achieved. The feature of "limited incentive" in government economics has made the supervision in government much urgent, which has always been an important problem, both worldwide and long-drawn, in spite of the differences in national status, economic system and developing level. It's determined by the special position government takes in market economics.This paper presents discusses on the following two questions. Why is supervision in need in government economics? How can we provide proper supervision? To the first question, after the logical analysis of society public goods demand and supply, state function and the publicly consigned responsibility of the government, the agent-principal relationships in government structure and the target of agency, the function of government economics in the developing process of market economics is clarified; further analyzing in the endogenetic inevitability of supervision in government economics is made on common economic agency in corporate, the agency character of public economics, public agency in government economics and the "dual-agency" in state-owned property rights; in the aspect of property rights, the point of interiorization of external supervision of SOEs is made; in the aspect of economics, the "public benefits" and output-and-input of government supervision are analyzed. To the second question, through the history exploration and comparison of supervising systems of western SOEs, positive analyzing of supervision of government economics in China, the supervision system structure, including basic course of supervision in SOAs and property rights, is made and clarified.This paper puts the government economics in the theory frame of "dual-agency", which means the authorizing relationship in SOEs includes two fields: one is administration authorization, a non-market one of citizens to government authorization formed though political procedure in non-market fields; one is economic authorization in market, in which a government to national assets managing sectors and SOEs, the operators, authorization is formed through economic procedure. Through a certain path, need and supervision - supervision system - input and output of supervision - supervising efficiency - supervision system structure, the ultimate goal of this paper is to increase the government economic efficiency, especially the SOEs, and to secure the state-own assets.This paper uses some modern economic and managerial approaches like system analysis, positive analysis and comparative analysis, combines normal analysis and positive analysis, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, theory and practice; settles special problems through common theory and ideas; analyses China's specific practice with modern main stream economic theory; But the limited information collecting due to the initiative character of government supervision have made it difficult to carry out systematic analysis.Logically, this paper includes three parts. The first is the introductive chapter including researching background, connotation and definition of government economic supervision, researching area and view angle, approaches adopted and key concepts and the fundamental framework. The second, chapter 1 to 4, is the theoretical analyzing part, in which discussions are made on problems like origination of supervision theory of government, property supervision system and economic problems in this field. The last includes chapte...
Keywords/Search Tags:government economics, SOEs and SOAs, property rights, supervision, system organization.
PDF Full Text Request
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