The Efficiency Of The Transfer Of Control Of The Company

The essence of transference of corPorate control is to reallocate the rare corporate controlresources. Thus, the efficient evaluation of corporate control transference fOcuses on whether theresources reallocation has improved and increased corporate va1ue, and eventUally enhanced thesocial wealth.ln the corporations with relatively more concCntrated ownership, and particularly for thoseowned by large shareholders, the tfaditional principal-agent theory can not give satisfiedexplanations regarding the corporate control transference. lnsteadly, according to the "tfansferabletrade" theory, the corporate control transference is interpreted as an active trading. Although thecurrently popular firm theories and M&A theories have paftly revealed the initiatives, conditions,ways and effects of the corporate control trading, it still lacks of theoretical analysis and'perspective on the trading efficiency -- one of the most imPofhat aspects conceming corporatecontrol transference. The main purpose of this paPer is to offset the pitfalls mentioned above fromtwo aspects: on one hand, to put forward an overall analytic skeleton on the corporate controltrading efficiency, on the other, to conduct comPrehensive comparisons among the efficiency ofdifferent trading models by using the skeleton. As the result, my work tries to reach someconclusions that could guide the practices of corporate control tradings.This paPer comPrises of tWo sections. The first section is "The efficient theory of corporatecontrol transference". Corporate ownership strUctUre and control transferable models are classifiedbased upon the ana1ysis of the preconditions and quality of the corporate control transference inthe first chapter: concentrated ownership structUre corresponds to the negotiable transferablemodel; dispersed ownership structure corresponds to the tender off model. After combining thetwo models and the two tapes of corporate control gains, we can get the overall analytic skeleton.In the second chapter, a general corporate control transference model in NS structure is putfOrward and the efficient effect is evaluated.ln the third chapter, a generaI corPorate control tran?ference model in NCS structure is'putfOrward and the efficient effect is evaluated.A variety of concIusions were reached in the fOurth chapter f first, the biding scope in NSstructure is much larger than that in NCS structure, as a possibIe effect, both efficient andillcfficient tral1sferences aIC more 1ike1y to take p1ace in NS structure than in NCS structure.1loxvcver, in NCS structurc, most incf11cie11t tral1sfbre11ccs al1d some effic]cnt tral1sfCrcnces witl1lo\v corporate va1ue-in1proved lcvel wiIl 11ot take place because of t1lc higl1 bidding li111it. Second,li-onl tlle Poillt of vie'x ()f pron1otil1g t11c eflicic11t tra11sfCre11ces, NCS structure is bcttcr tI1an NS'lstructure because there are relatively more efficient transferences taking place in NS structure than in NCS structure. Third, NCS structure is better than NS structure from the point of view of preventing the inefficient transferences, because almost all inefficient transferences can not take place in NCS structure. Finally, from the aspect of expecting efficient cost, the difference among controllers seizing the controlling private gains, the absolute level of seizure and the attribution of related variable imposes important effect on the expecting efficient cost of the corporate control transference.The second section is "The efficient analysis of corporate control transferences in China". The main model of corporate control transferences in China, the negotiable transferable model, and its foundation of ownership-structure and government-activity are analyzed in the fifth chapter. * *In the sixth chapter, a variety of efficient and inefficient transferable problems are put forward and appraised. The main body of the seventh chapter explains why there are fewer tender offs taking place fr...